CVE-2026-107388 in music-metadata
Summary
by MITRE • 10/08/2026
music-metadata is a metadata parser for audio and video media files. Prior to 11.16.0, the ID3v2 parser trusts the syncsafe tag-size field and allocates the complete tag body before checking whether the input contains the declared bytes. A truncated file containing only an ID3v2 header can request an allocation approaching 268 MiB; the allocation succeeds, the subsequent read reaches end of stream, the EndOfStreamError is caught internally, and the caller receives a normal metadata object. This issue is fixed in version 11.16.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/08/2026
The vulnerability identified in music-metadata versions prior to 11.16.0 stems from an improper input validation mechanism within the ID3v2 tag parser, specifically concerning how memory resources are allocated relative to declared file sizes. The core technical flaw lies in the sequence of operations performed when parsing a media file header. Upon encountering an ID3v2 frame, the library reads the syncsafe integer field which indicates the total size of the subsequent tag body. Instead of first verifying that this amount of data actually exists within the input stream or buffer boundaries, the parser proceeds to allocate memory for the entire declared size immediately. This design choice creates a window where maliciously crafted inputs can trigger excessive resource consumption without immediate failure detection based on file integrity.
When an attacker provides a truncated audio or video file containing only the ID3v2 header with a large syncsafe tag-size value, such as one approaching 268 megabytes, the application attempts to allocate that substantial amount of memory. In many execution environments, this allocation succeeds because the system has sufficient virtual address space or physical RAM available at that moment. The parser then proceeds to read data from the stream into this allocated buffer. However, since the input file is truncated and does not contain the full body declared in the header, the read operation quickly reaches the end of the stream. This condition triggers an internal EndOfStreamError exception.
Although the error is caught internally by the library's error handling logic, preventing a direct application crash or denial-of-service through unhandled exceptions, the side effect remains significant. The large memory allocation persists until garbage collection occurs, leading to increased memory pressure on the host system. Furthermore, despite the incomplete data read, the caller receives what appears to be a normal metadata object rather than an error indication that parsing failed due to insufficient data. This behavior can lead to subtle logical errors in downstream applications that assume successful and complete metadata extraction when they have actually received partial or default values masked by silent failure handling.
From a classification perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, as the application fails to limit the amount of resources consumed during input processing. It also relates to CWE-20 Improper Input Validation because the parser does not adequately verify that the declared size matches the actual available data before committing system resources. In terms of attack vectors and techniques, this vulnerability can be leveraged in contexts where media files are processed automatically, such as music streaming services or digital asset management systems, potentially contributing to resource exhaustion scenarios akin to those described under ATT&CK technique T1496 Resource Hijacking if exploited at scale across multiple concurrent requests.
To mitigate this risk, organizations relying on the affected version of music-metadata should upgrade immediately to version 11.16.0 or later, where the parsing logic has been corrected to validate input boundaries before allocating memory. For systems that cannot be updated instantly, implementing strict limits on file sizes at the ingestion layer is recommended. By capping the maximum allowable size for media files and validating headers against these caps prior to passing them to the parser, administrators can prevent the allocation of excessive memory regardless of the values contained within the ID3v2 syncsafe field. Additionally, monitoring system memory usage during batch processing operations can help detect anomalous spikes that may indicate exploitation attempts or malformed file uploads.