CVE-2026-108616 in JeecgBoot
Summary
by MITRE • 10/11/2026
JeecgBoot through 3.9.5 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the AiragExtDataController deleteBatch handler that allows any authenticated user to delete AI evaluator records. Low-privileged attackers can send comma-separated ids to DELETE /airag/extData/deleteBatch, which lacks owner or tenant checks, deleting other users' evaluator and test-tracking records.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/11/2026
The vulnerability identified in JeecgBoot versions up to 3.9.5 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within the AiragExtDataController module. Specifically, the deleteBatch handler for AI evaluator records lacks proper authorization checks regarding resource ownership and tenant isolation. This flaw allows any authenticated user, regardless of their privilege level or organizational affiliation, to execute deletion operations on data belonging to other users. The core technical issue lies in the absence of validation logic that verifies whether the requesting user has explicit permission to modify or destroy the specific records targeted by the request. In a multi-tenant SaaS environment or an application with strict role-based access control, such as JeecgBoot is designed for, this omission fundamentally breaks the principle of least privilege and data isolation.
From a technical perspective, the exploitation vector involves sending HTTP DELETE requests to the endpoint /airag/extData/deleteBatch. The payload typically consists of comma-separated identifiers corresponding to the target records. Because the backend implementation does not cross-reference these identifiers against the authenticated user's identity or tenant context before processing the deletion command, it blindly executes the database operation. This behavior indicates a server-side logic error where input validation is performed for format and syntax but neglected for semantic authorization. The attacker can enumerate valid record IDs through various means, such as inspecting network traffic from legitimate users or exploiting other information disclosure vulnerabilities, and then systematically delete them using this endpoint.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in environments handling sensitive AI evaluation data and test-tracking records. Unauthorized deletion leads to a complete loss of integrity for the affected datasets. For organizations relying on these systems for quality assurance, performance monitoring, or compliance auditing, the destruction of evaluator records can result in significant business disruption, including the inability to generate accurate reports or maintain historical baselines. Furthermore, if the deleted data contains proprietary algorithms or sensitive testing methodologies, this constitutes a direct compromise of intellectual property and potentially violates regulatory requirements regarding data retention and integrity. The ability for low-privileged users to impact high-value assets amplifies the risk profile significantly.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-284, which describes Improper Access Control, specifically highlighting failures in authorization checks that allow unauthorized actions on protected resources. It also maps closely to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as it leverages legitimate authentication credentials to perform malicious activities without requiring privilege escalation or credential theft. Additionally, the mass deletion aspect relates to data destruction capabilities often associated with insider threats or compromised accounts aiming to disrupt operations.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust server-side authorization checks within the deleteBatch handler. Developers should ensure that every database operation verifies that the authenticated user owns the resource or possesses a specific role granting permission to manage it across tenants if applicable. Implementing strict tenant isolation logic is essential in multi-tenant architectures to prevent cross-tenant data access. Additionally, introducing audit logging for all deletion events can aid in forensic analysis and detection of such abuse patterns. Regular security code reviews focusing on authorization flows and the implementation of automated testing suites that specifically target broken object level permissions are recommended to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future releases.