CVE-2026-108756 in Trinity
Summary
by MITRE • 10/11/2026
Abilityai Trinity through 0.9.5 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the Telegram router that allows agent-scoped MCP API keys to perform human-only binding operations. Attackers controlling an agent, typically via prompt injection, can send messages through the owner's bot token, replace the binding with their own token, or delete it.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/11/2026
The identified vulnerability within Abilityai Trinity versions up to 0.9.5 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms specifically affecting the Telegram router component of the system. This flaw is classified as a missing authorization issue where the application fails to properly verify whether an authenticated agent possesses the necessary privileges to execute specific administrative or binding operations. In typical secure architectures, distinct separation exists between user-level permissions and administrator-level actions such as token binding management. However, in this implementation, the security boundary is insufficiently enforced, allowing entities operating under restricted agent scopes to interact with endpoints intended exclusively for human administrators or system owners.
The technical root cause lies in the validation logic of the Telegram router which processes API requests from MCP agents. When an agent initiates a request related to binding operations, the backend does not adequately check if the caller's identity and associated permissions align with the required authorization level for that specific action. Consequently, any entity possessing valid agent-scoped Model Context Protocol keys can invoke these restricted functions as if they were authorized administrators. This architectural oversight effectively bypasses the intended role-based access control model, treating all authenticated agents with equal privilege regarding sensitive configuration changes rather than enforcing strict hierarchical permissions.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential for exploitation via prompt injection attacks. An attacker who has compromised an agent through social engineering or malicious input can leverage this authorization bypass to manipulate the bot's integration state. Specifically, the attacker can replace the legitimate owner's binding token with one controlled by the adversary, effectively hijacking control over the Telegram bot interface. Alternatively, the attacker may delete existing bindings entirely, causing a denial of service for legitimate users and disrupting ongoing interactions. This capability allows an adversary to assume full administrative control over the messaging channel associated with the application, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within connected systems.
From a threat intelligence perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-287 Improper Authentication and CWE-269 Unauthorized Privilege Escalation as defined by industry standards. The exploitation vector corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter via prompt injection, where the initial compromise of an agent serves as the entry point for escalating privileges within the application layer. The ability to modify binding configurations also relates to potential persistence mechanisms if attackers establish their own tokens to maintain long-term access even after original credentials are rotated or revoked by legitimate administrators.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching to version 0.9.6 or later where these authorization checks have been corrected. In the interim, organizations should implement strict input validation and output encoding on all agent-facing endpoints to mitigate prompt injection risks that serve as the primary exploitation vector. Additionally, enforcing principle of least privilege by isolating agent API keys from administrative functions is essential. Security teams should also monitor for anomalous changes in binding configurations or unexpected token replacements within Telegram bot integrations. Regular audits of access control lists and implementation of multi-factor authentication for sensitive operational actions can further reduce the risk surface associated with such authorization bypasses.