CVE-2026-109394 in Thirty bees
Summary
by MITRE • 10/12/2026
Thirty bees through 1.7.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in PasswordController::resolveCustomer() that allows unauthenticated attackers to reset registered customers' passwords using guest account tokens. Attackers can place a guest order with the victim's email, then use the guest secure key to reset and take over the victim's account when guest checkout is enabled.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/12/2026
The vulnerability identified in Thirty Bees versions up to 1.7.0 represents a critical authentication bypass flaw located within the PasswordController::resolveCustomer() method. This security defect stems from an insufficient validation of identity tokens during the password reset workflow, specifically when the platform is configured to allow guest checkout functionality. The core technical issue lies in the system's failure to strictly bind the provided secure key or token to a specific customer account before initiating the credential update process. Instead, the application relies on the presence of a valid-looking token associated with an email address without verifying that this token was originally issued for that exact user identity under authenticated conditions. This architectural oversight allows attackers to exploit the loose coupling between guest session data and permanent customer accounts.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability enables unauthenticated actors to perform account takeover attacks against registered users on the e-commerce platform. The attack vector is straightforward yet effective: an attacker first places a test order using the victim's email address as a guest user. This action generates a unique secure key or token associated with that specific transaction and email combination within the system's database. Because the password reset mechanism accepts this guest-generated token to identify the target account, the attacker can subsequently invoke the resolveCustomer() function along with the stolen guest token. The system erroneously interprets this guest token as valid for resetting the password of the registered customer associated with that email address, thereby granting the attacker full administrative control over the victim's account without ever possessing their original credentials or having completed a legitimate authentication process.
This type of vulnerability is classified under CWE-287, which covers Improper Authentication, and more specifically aligns with CWE-613 regarding Insufficient Session Expiration, as it exploits the reuse of session-related tokens for privileged actions they were not intended to support. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior maps directly to T1078 Valid Accounts, where an adversary uses legitimate credentials or account properties to gain access. It also reflects aspects of T1528 Steal Application Access Token if viewed through the lens of token misuse, although it is more accurately described as a logic flaw in identity verification rather than simple theft. The impact extends beyond mere unauthorized login; attackers can modify customer details, view order history, exploit stored payment methods if applicable, and potentially use the compromised account to conduct further social engineering attacks against other users or administrators by appearing as a trusted entity within the ecosystem.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The most urgent fix involves modifying the PasswordController::resolveCustomer() logic to ensure that any token used for password reset is explicitly validated against the specific customer ID associated with the email, rather than just matching the email string alone. If a guest order was placed using an existing customer's email, the system must distinguish between the guest session context and the permanent account context, preventing cross-context authentication bypasses. Additionally, implementing stricter token lifecycle management where guest tokens are invalidated upon conversion to a registered account or after a short expiration window would reduce the attack surface. Administrators should also consider disabling guest checkout if it is not strictly necessary for their business model, as this removes the primary vector for exploitation. Regular security audits focusing on identity and access management flows are essential to detect similar logic flaws in other parts of the application where session tokens or authentication keys might be reused across different privilege levels.