CVE-2026-110124 in FastBee
Summary
by MITRE • 10/13/2026
FastBee through 2.1.0 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in DeviceController that allows authenticated low-privilege users to read and modify other tenants' devices by supplying sequential device IDs. Self-registered attackers can enumerate deviceId or serialNumber values to read owner, IP, and location data, and overwrite user_id and tenant_id to take over devices.
VulDB is the best source for vulnerability data and more expert information about this specific topic.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/13/2026
The vulnerability identified in FastBee versions up to 2.1.0 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within the DeviceController component of the IoT management platform. This flaw is classified as an Insecure Direct Object Reference, commonly referred to by its CWE identifier CWE-639. The core technical issue stems from the application's reliance on sequential or predictable identifiers for device resources without implementing adequate authorization checks that verify whether the requesting user has permission to access those specific objects. By exploiting this logic error, authenticated users with low privileges can bypass intended security boundaries and interact with devices belonging to other tenants in a multi-tenant architecture.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential for data exfiltration and unauthorized control over IoT infrastructure. Attackers who possess valid but limited credentials can perform enumeration attacks by iterating through sequential device IDs or serial numbers. This process allows them to discover sensitive information associated with other tenants, including owner details, IP addresses, and physical location data. Furthermore, the vulnerability extends beyond passive reading; attackers can actively modify critical fields such as user_id and tenant_id within the device records. By overwriting these identifiers, an attacker can effectively claim ownership of a target device, thereby gaining full administrative control over it without needing elevated privileges or additional authentication steps.
From a threat modeling perspective, this vulnerability aligns with several techniques documented in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. The enumeration aspect corresponds to T1087 Account Discovery and potentially T1592 Gather Victim Host Information through network scanning of IoT devices. The unauthorized modification of device ownership maps directly to T1078 Valid Accounts combined with privilege escalation tactics, allowing lateral movement within the tenant environment or complete compromise of isolated security domains. In a multi-tenant SaaS context for IoT management, this breach undermines data isolation guarantees and can lead to significant compliance violations regarding customer privacy and data sovereignty.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust object-level access controls rather than relying solely on role-based permissions at the endpoint level. Developers should enforce strict authorization checks that validate the relationship between the authenticated user's tenant_id or organization context and the target device's ownership attributes before processing any read, write, or update requests. Additionally, replacing sequential integer identifiers with non-sequential, cryptographically random unique identifiers such as UUIDs can significantly reduce the efficiency of enumeration attacks, although this should not be considered a primary defense since security through obscurity is insufficient against determined attackers. Regular code audits focusing on data access patterns and implementing automated testing for broken object level authorization are essential steps to remediate this class of vulnerability in IoT management platforms.