CVE-2026-110185 in Bit Flows Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/28/2026
The Bit Flows: AI Agent Automation & Integrations for Forms, CRM, eCommerce, Google Sheets, and More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 1.31.0 via the 'image (any body field referenced by the ImageHelper node's mix tag)' parameter parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary .php files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where .php file types can be uploaded and included. Exploitation requires that an administrator has built a webhook-triggered flow that pipes a webhook body field into an ImageHelper imageToBase64 node, and that the webhook remains in its default configuration (no bearer secret enforced, no IP allowlist set) — a legitimate and documented use case.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/28/2026
The vulnerability identified within The Bit Flows plugin for WordPress represents a critical Local File Inclusion flaw affecting all versions up to 1.31.0. This security defect is rooted in the improper validation of user-supplied input passed through the image parameter, specifically when this field is referenced by the ImageHelper node's mix tag during webhook processing workflows. The core technical issue arises because the application fails to sanitize or restrict file paths before attempting to include them within PHP execution contexts. By manipulating the body fields associated with an ImageHelper operation, an attacker can inject relative or absolute path sequences that point to arbitrary files residing on the server’s filesystem rather than legitimate image assets intended for conversion processes.
Exploitation of this vulnerability requires specific configuration conditions but remains feasible under documented and common usage scenarios. An administrator must have established a webhook-triggered flow where incoming data is piped into an ImageHelper node configured with the imageToBase64 function. Crucially, the webhook endpoint must remain in its default state without additional security hardening measures such as bearer token authentication or IP address allowlisting. Under these conditions, unauthenticated attackers can send crafted HTTP requests containing maliciously constructed path strings within the expected body fields. The server then processes this input by attempting to include and execute the specified file as PHP code, effectively bypassing standard access controls that would normally restrict direct execution of arbitrary scripts.
The operational impact of this Local File Inclusion is severe, potentially leading to complete system compromise. Since the included files are executed with the same privileges as the web server process, attackers can achieve remote code execution on the target host. This capability allows for a wide range of malicious activities including data exfiltration from sensitive databases, modification or deletion of critical application files, and further lateral movement within the network infrastructure. The ability to execute arbitrary PHP code means that threat actors can deploy backdoors, install web shells, or pivot to other systems connected to the compromised server, significantly escalating the risk profile for organizations relying on this automation tool.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-98 Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require in PHP Programs and is categorized under ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter via local file inclusion mechanisms. To mitigate this risk, immediate action should be taken to update The Bit Flows plugin to a version that addresses the input validation flaws within the ImageHelper node’s handling of webhook body fields. Administrators who cannot immediately patch their systems are advised to enforce strict authentication requirements on all webhook endpoints by implementing bearer token verification and restricting access via IP allowlists where possible. Additionally, reviewing workflow configurations to ensure that sensitive data is not unnecessarily exposed through unsecured webhooks will reduce the attack surface available for exploitation of this specific vulnerability vector.