CVE-2026-88967 in Grafana
Summary
by MITRE • 10/28/2026
A user with query access to an Azure Monitor data source in Grafana can cause server-side requests to an attacker-controlled endpoint that disclose the data source's Azure access token (server-side request forgery).
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/28/2026
The vulnerability described constitutes a Server-Side Request Forgery, commonly referred to as SSRF, within the integration of Grafana with Microsoft Azure Monitor. This security flaw arises from insufficient validation or sanitization of user-supplied input when constructing HTTP requests on behalf of the server. Specifically, an attacker who possesses query access privileges to an Azure Monitor data source in a Grafana instance can manipulate request parameters to direct internal server-side operations toward external endpoints controlled by the adversary. The core technical failure lies in the application's trust model, which assumes that users with read-only or query permissions are benign actors and fails to enforce strict allow-listing of destination hosts for outgoing requests initiated during data retrieval processes.
From a technical perspective, this SSRF allows an authenticated user to exploit the server's elevated privileges. Since Grafana acts as an intermediary proxy when querying Azure Monitor, it must authenticate with Microsoft's identity platform using stored credentials or managed identities. When the application constructs a request based on maliciously crafted input provided by the attacker, the server executes this request under its own context. Consequently, the outgoing HTTP traffic includes authentication headers and tokens associated with the Grafana service principal or user-assigned managed identity configured for that specific data source. By directing these requests to an external endpoint controlled by the attacker, such as a custom logging server or webhook receiver, the sensitive Azure access token is exfiltrated from the secure environment of the cloud provider to the adversary's infrastructure.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the principle of least privilege being bypassed through credential theft rather than direct exploitation of application logic flaws that lead to code execution. The disclosure of the Azure access token grants the attacker potential unauthorized access to a wide range of Azure resources associated with that identity, including storage accounts, virtual machines, and other monitored services. This effectively escalates the threat from a low-privilege user account compromise to a high-severity breach of cloud infrastructure integrity. Attackers can use these stolen tokens to perform further reconnaissance, exfiltrate sensitive data stored in Azure, or pivot deeper into the network by leveraging the trust relationships established between Azure resources and identity providers.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery as a weakness where an attacker is able cause the server-side application to make requests to arbitrary URLs. Furthermore, it maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1557, specifically Adversary-in-the-Middle or Credential Access via Lateral Tool Transfer if interpreted broadly, but more accurately fits under T1078 Valid Accounts and potentially T1552 Unsecured Credentials depending on how the token is stored. The exploitation path involves leveraging valid credentials to access resources that would otherwise be protected by network segmentation or identity-based access controls.
Mitigation strategies must focus on strict input validation and secure configuration of outbound requests. Developers should implement a rigorous allow-listing mechanism for all outgoing HTTP connections initiated by Grafana, ensuring that only known and trusted Azure Monitor endpoints are accessible during data query operations. Additionally, implementing egress filtering at the network level can restrict outbound traffic to specific IP ranges or domains required for legitimate operation. For organizations using managed identities, rotating credentials immediately upon detection of potential exposure is critical. Long-term remediation involves upgrading Grafana to versions where this SSRF vector has been patched and reviewing data source configurations to ensure that query capabilities do not inadvertently expose internal authentication mechanisms to user-controlled parameters.