CVE-2026-111417 in Foxit
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
A broken access control vulnerability exists in the Foxit official website’s HTML-to-PDF conversion service due to the use of a shared token for submitted conversion documents. This may allow unauthorized users to access documents submitted by other users.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The identified security flaw represents a critical failure in implementing proper authorization mechanisms within the web application layer, specifically affecting the document processing functionality of the Foxit official website. The vulnerability stems from an insecure direct object reference pattern where the system relies on a single shared token to authenticate and authorize access to conversion requests. In secure architectural designs, each user session or specific file upload operation should be associated with unique, unpredictable identifiers that are strictly bound to the requesting user's identity and permissions. By utilizing a static or globally accessible token for submitted documents, the application fails to enforce isolation between different users' data contexts. This design oversight allows an attacker who can intercept or predict this shared identifier to bypass access controls entirely, effectively treating all uploaded files as public resources rather than private assets belonging to specific individuals.
From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns directly with CWE-639, which categorizes vulnerabilities related to authorization issues involving direct object references where the application does not verify that the user is authorized for the requested data. The operational impact of such a vulnerability is severe, as it potentially exposes sensitive proprietary information, personal identifiable information, or confidential business documents uploaded by legitimate users. An adversary could exploit this weakness by systematically iterating through document identifiers associated with the shared token to retrieve files they do not own. This constitutes an unauthorized access scenario where confidentiality is compromised without requiring any prior authentication credentials beyond knowledge of the token structure, significantly lowering the barrier for exploitation compared to traditional brute-force or credential-stuffing attacks.
In terms of threat modeling and adversary behavior, this vulnerability facilitates data exfiltration through automated scraping techniques that are characteristic of reconnaissance phases in cyber-kill chain models. Specifically, it maps to ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, if the shared token allows access without full authentication, or more accurately to unauthorized access patterns seen in lateral movement and collection phases where an attacker harvests sensitive data from a compromised service endpoint. The risk is exacerbated by the fact that PDF conversion services often handle high volumes of diverse document types, increasing the likelihood of containing highly valuable intellectual property or regulated data such as financial records or healthcare information.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation efforts must focus on implementing robust access control checks at every stage of the request lifecycle. The shared token mechanism should be replaced with a system that generates unique, cryptographically secure session identifiers for each user and each individual file upload operation. These identifiers must be validated server-side against an authorization database to ensure that only the owner of the document can retrieve or process it. Additionally, implementing rate limiting on conversion endpoints can help mitigate automated scraping attempts while more permanent fixes are deployed. Security headers should also be configured to prevent caching of sensitive responses in shared proxies or browsers, further reducing the window of exposure for unauthorized parties attempting to harvest these documents through passive observation or cache poisoning techniques.