CVE-2026-110238 in Rapyd Admin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/13/2026
Rapyd Admin from 9.0.0 before 9.20.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated company members with the default customer role to modify or delete arbitrary user accounts through the UsersModalEditEmbed Livewire component. Attackers can dispatch editUser or deleteUser with predictable sequential user ids to reset owner or super admin passwords, promote themselves to owner, and delete users.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/13/2026
The vulnerability identified in Rapyd Admin versions prior to 9.20.0 represents a critical authorization bypass flaw within the application's administrative interface. This security defect specifically affects authenticated company members who possess the default customer role, which should inherently restrict their access to sensitive administrative functions. The core of the issue lies in the improper implementation of access controls on the UsersModalEditEmbed Livewire component. Instead of verifying whether the requesting user has sufficient privileges to perform actions such as modifying or deleting other user accounts, the system relies on predictable sequential identifiers for user IDs. This architectural oversight allows an attacker with minimal initial permissions to interact directly with backend endpoints intended exclusively for high-privilege administrators, effectively bypassing role-based access control mechanisms entirely.
From a technical perspective, the exploitation of this vulnerability hinges on two primary factors: the lack of server-side authorization checks and the predictability of resource identifiers. The Livewire component processes requests containing editUser or deleteUser actions without validating if the requester is authorized to manage the target account. Furthermore, because user IDs are assigned sequentially, an attacker can easily enumerate valid targets by iterating through a range of integer values. This combination enables precise targeting of specific accounts, including those belonging to system owners and super administrators. By manipulating these endpoints, an adversary can alter critical attributes such as password hashes or role assignments, thereby escalating their privileges within the application environment.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, potentially leading to a complete compromise of the administrative infrastructure. An attacker who exploits this flaw can reset passwords for owner or super admin accounts, effectively taking control of these high-privilege identities. Additionally, they can promote themselves to an owner role, granting unrestricted access to all system features and data. The ability to delete arbitrary user accounts further exacerbates the risk by enabling denial-of-service conditions against legitimate users or removing audit trails that might otherwise detect malicious activity. This level of control allows for comprehensive manipulation of business logic, theft of sensitive customer data, and potential integration with downstream systems if administrative credentials are reused elsewhere.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-269, which describes Improper Privilege Management, as the application fails to enforce appropriate access levels for different user roles. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, where attackers leverage legitimate credentials and escalate privileges by exploiting misconfigurations in authorization logic. The use of sequential IDs relates to CWE-200, Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Information Retrieval, although the primary risk here is functional rather than informational disclosure. To mitigate this issue, organizations must immediately upgrade Rapyd Admin to version 9.20.0 or later where these access control checks have been rectified. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, implementing strict server-side authorization validation for all administrative endpoints and replacing sequential identifiers with non-sequential UUIDs can significantly reduce the attack surface. Regular security audits focusing on role-based access controls are also recommended to prevent similar privilege escalation flaws in future development cycles.