CVE-2026-110770 in Databasus
Summary
by MITRE • 10/14/2026
Databasus 3.7.0 through 3.61.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to brute-force password reset codes via POST /api/v1/users/reset-password. Attackers can request a six-digit code for a known email, then guess it without rate limiting, lockout, or invalidation to take over accounts, including administrators.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/14/2026
The vulnerability identified in Databasus versions 3.7.0 through 3.61.0 represents a critical authentication bypass flaw rooted in the improper implementation of password reset mechanisms. This security defect allows unauthenticated attackers to compromise user accounts by exploiting weaknesses in the verification process for password reset codes. Specifically, the application exposes an endpoint at POST /api/v1/users/reset-password which facilitates the generation and validation of six-digit numeric codes used to verify a users identity during account recovery procedures. The core technical flaw lies in the lack of robust controls surrounding these temporary credentials, creating a pathway for malicious actors to bypass standard authentication protocols entirely without possessing valid login credentials initially.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability enables attackers to perform brute-force attacks against password reset codes with minimal resistance from the application security controls. When an attacker identifies a known email address associated with a Databasus account, they can trigger the generation of a six-digit reset code via the aforementioned API endpoint. Crucially, the system fails to implement rate limiting on subsequent validation attempts for that specific code or IP address. Furthermore, there is no lockout mechanism triggered after multiple failed guesses, nor does the application invalidate the reset code immediately upon its first use or after a short expiration window that is strictly enforced during verification. This absence of defensive measures means an attacker can systematically iterate through all one million possible combinations for a six-digit numeric code in a relatively short timeframe using automated scripts.
The impact of this vulnerability extends beyond standard user account compromise, as it explicitly includes administrative accounts within the scope of potential exploitation. By successfully guessing the reset code and resetting the password, an attacker gains full control over the targeted account. For administrator-level accounts, this results in complete system takeover, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive data, configuration changes, and potentially further lateral movement within the network infrastructure dependent on Databasus services. This level of access compromise undermines the integrity and confidentiality guarantees provided by the platform, posing a severe risk to organizations relying on its database management capabilities.
In terms of industry standard classifications, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-287 Improper Authentication, as the system fails to adequately verify the identity of users attempting to reset passwords. It also relates closely to CWE-307 Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts, given the lack of rate limiting and account lockout features that would typically mitigate brute-force attacks. From a tactical perspective within the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this exploit maps directly to T1078 Valid Accounts, where adversaries use legitimate credentials obtained through password guessing or reset exploitation to maintain persistent access. The specific technique employed falls under credential stuffing or brute force methodologies adapted for account recovery flows rather than direct login pages.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate action is required by system administrators and developers responsible for maintaining Databasus instances within the affected version range. The most effective remediation strategy involves upgrading to a patched version of Databasus where these authentication controls have been hardened. If an upgrade is not immediately feasible, temporary mitigations should include implementing rate limiting on the password reset API endpoint to restrict the number of validation attempts allowed per user or IP address within a specific time window. Additionally, introducing account lockout policies after a small threshold of failed verification attempts can significantly raise the cost and difficulty for attackers performing brute-force operations. Enforcing strict expiration times for reset codes that are invalidated upon any use attempt, whether successful or not, further reduces the attack surface by limiting the window of opportunity for guessing valid tokens.