CVE-2026-112045 in donetick
Summary
by MITRE • 10/19/2026
A vulnerability was detected in donetick up to 0.1.82. The impacted element is the function CanDeleteHistory of the file internal/chore/model/model.go of the component History Deletion Handler. The manipulation of the argument AssignedTo results in improper authorization. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The project maintainer explains: "The concerns about "IDOR" framing seem to be overstated in my opinion (...), as Circle members are already trusted collaborators. We will address this issue. However, since the impact is limited to trusted members within the same circle, I would classify this as a bug rather than a security vulnerability."
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/19/2026
The identified flaw resides within the donetick application, specifically affecting versions up through 0.1.82, and centers on the CanDeleteHistory function located in the internal/chore/model/model.go file of the History Deletion Handler component. This technical defect manifests as an improper authorization mechanism where the manipulation of the AssignedTo argument allows a user to bypass intended access controls. By altering this specific input parameter during request processing, an attacker can trick the application into believing that the deletion action is authorized for their account or role, even when they lack the necessary permissions to perform such operations on other users' data. This represents a classic instance of Insecure Direct Object Reference, commonly categorized under CWE-639 in industry standard vulnerability taxonomies, where object identifiers are exposed and not sufficiently validated against the current user's authorization context before performing sensitive actions.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to its remote exploitability. Since the attack vector does not require local access or physical proximity to the target system, it can be launched over a network connection by any authenticated user who has obtained valid session credentials for the application. The fact that an exploit code is currently public and available further elevates the risk profile, as automated scanning tools and malicious actors can readily leverage this knowledge to compromise data integrity within affected instances. Although the project maintainer has characterized the issue as a bug rather than a critical security vulnerability based on the premise that Circle members are trusted collaborators with limited scope of impact, this assessment overlooks the fundamental principle of least privilege and defense in depth. Even among trusted users, unauthorized deletion of history records constitutes an integrity violation that can lead to data loss, audit trail corruption, or disruption of operational workflows depending on how critical historical logs are to the organization's compliance and forensic capabilities.
From a threat intelligence perspective, this vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as it relies on legitimate authentication credentials being misused due to flawed authorization logic rather than credential theft or privilege escalation through other means. The ability to manipulate assigned identifiers suggests that the application fails to enforce proper object-level access controls, allowing users to interact with resources belonging to others without explicit permission checks. This type of flaw is particularly dangerous in collaborative environments where multiple users share access but have distinct roles and responsibilities. Without strict validation ensuring that the AssignedTo field matches the identity or permissions of the requesting user, the application remains susceptible to unauthorized data modification by any authenticated participant within the system boundaries.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate remediation through software updates provided by the vendor, as patches are expected to address this authorization bypass in subsequent releases beyond version 0.1.82. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, administrators should implement strict input validation and access control checks at the application layer to ensure that only authorized users can delete history records associated with their own assignments or explicitly permitted entities. Additionally, deploying Web Application Firewalls with rules capable of detecting anomalous patterns in parameter manipulation may provide a temporary defensive measure against exploitation attempts. Regular security audits focusing on authorization logic and continuous monitoring for unusual deletion activities are also recommended to detect potential abuse early. Ultimately, treating this issue as a critical vulnerability rather than a minor bug is advisable given the public availability of exploits and the inherent risks associated with improper access control mechanisms in multi-user applications.