CVE-2026-114223 in NT OneAPP
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2026
NT OneAPP developed by NewType Infortech has an Exposure of Sensitive Information vulnerability. Unauthenticated local attackers can extract plaintext usernames and passwords from backup data after obtaining ADB backup access authorization and user confirmation of the backup, resulting in sensitive information disclosure.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/23/2026
The vulnerability identified within NT OneAPP, developed by NewType Infortech, represents a critical failure in application security design regarding the handling of device backups via Android Debug Bridge (ADB). This flaw allows unauthenticated local attackers to extract plaintext usernames and passwords from backup data files. The exploitation chain begins with an attacker gaining physical access or control over the target device's ADB interface. While modern versions of Android require user confirmation for a full application backup, this trust model is insufficient when combined with weak encryption practices within the specific application implementation. Once the user authorizes the backup operation through the standard system prompt, the resulting .ab file contains sensitive credentials in an easily recoverable format, bypassing any intended security controls that might have been expected to protect such data during transit or storage on the host machine performing the backup.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability stems from improper implementation of encryption mechanisms for application-specific backups. Although Android provides APIs for applications to specify whether their data should be backed up and how it is encrypted, NT OneAPP appears to either disable these protections entirely or use weak cryptographic standards that do not prevent offline decryption by an attacker with access to the backup file. The ADB tool itself does not encrypt the payload of a full application backup unless explicitly configured by the developer using specific flags such as --noapk and proper encryption keys, which are often omitted in default configurations for ease of development or debugging. Consequently, the plaintext data is written directly to disk on the attacker's machine after extraction from the device storage via standard ADB commands like adb pull or through a full backup dump that can be parsed using tools designed to decode Android backup archives.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in enterprise environments where NT OneAPP may handle sensitive corporate credentials, authentication tokens, or personally identifiable information. An attacker with local access could extract these plaintext passwords and use them for lateral movement within a network, credential stuffing attacks against other services if users reuse passwords, or direct unauthorized access to the application itself. This exposure undermines the confidentiality integrity of user data and can lead to significant financial loss, reputational damage, and regulatory non-compliance depending on the nature of the stored information. The fact that this occurs after explicit user confirmation highlights a dangerous misconception among end-users who may believe that authorizing an ADB backup is safe because it involves their consent, not realizing that they are effectively handing over unencrypted secrets to any device connected via USB or network debugging.
This issue aligns with CWE-312, which classifies the exposure of sensitive information through cleartext storage in a non-volatile medium such as disk files created by backup operations. Furthermore, it relates to CWE-922 regarding improper access control if the application fails to restrict who can initiate or view these backups effectively beyond the OS-level permission check. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability facilitates Credential Access techniques, specifically T1552.004 Unsecured Credentials found in local system images and backup files. It also touches upon T1608.003 Steal Application Backup Data if viewed through the lens of mobile-specific attack vectors where attackers leverage legitimate administrative tools like ADB to exfiltrate data that should remain protected by application-level security controls.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary recommendation is for NewType Infortech to update NT OneAPP to disable the ability of users or external tools to perform full backups of sensitive data fields. This can be achieved by setting android:allowBackup=false in the application manifest, which prevents ADB from backing up the app's private data entirely. Alternatively, if backup functionality is required for legitimate purposes such as user migration, the developer must implement strong encryption using AES-256 or similar standards and ensure that keys are derived securely without being stored in plaintext within the APK or accessible via standard debugging interfaces. Additionally, implementing certificate pinning and ensuring that sensitive data is never written to external storage paths accessible by backup tools can further reduce risk. Security awareness training for users should also emphasize the risks of enabling USB debugging and authorizing backups on untrusted devices, as this remains a common vector for credential theft in both personal and corporate mobile environments.