CVE-2026-112059 in libLAS
Summary
by MITRE • 10/18/2026
libLAS through 1.8.1 contains a heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the point record reader caused by truncating the schema byte size to 16 bits when sizing the point buffer. Attackers can craft a .las file with a LASSchema variable length record whose schema exceeds 65535 bytes, so tools like lasinfo, las2las, or las2txt write attacker-controlled bytes past the heap buffer, causing memory corruption and crashes.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/18/2026
The vulnerability identified in libLAS versions through 1.8.1 represents a critical security flaw within the point record reader component of this widely used library for processing LiDAR data files. The core technical issue stems from an integer truncation error during the allocation and sizing of heap memory buffers. Specifically, when parsing the LASSchema variable length records embedded within a .las file, the software incorrectly limits the schema byte size to 16 bits. This architectural decision imposes a hard cap on the maximum buffer size at 65535 bytes, regardless of the actual data requirements specified in the malformed input file. By crafting a malicious .las file that declares a LASSchema variable length record with a size exceeding this threshold, an attacker can exploit this discrepancy to trigger a heap out-of-bounds write condition.
When libLAS processes such a crafted file using tools like lasinfo, las2las, or las2txt, the application allocates a buffer based on the truncated 16-bit value rather than the true size indicated in the header. However, subsequent operations attempt to read and copy data into this undersized buffer according to the full length specified by the attacker-controlled input. This mismatch results in writing bytes past the end of the allocated heap memory region. The immediate operational impact is severe memory corruption, which typically manifests as application crashes or denial-of-service conditions for users processing untrusted LiDAR datasets. In more sophisticated attack scenarios where specific memory layouts can be manipulated through repeated exploitation attempts, this out-of-bounds write could potentially lead to arbitrary code execution by overwriting adjacent heap metadata or function pointers.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-120, Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input, as the software fails to verify that the input data fits within the allocated buffer boundaries before performing copy operations. It also relates closely to CWE-685, Function Call With Incorrect Number of Arguments, insofar as the internal logic misinterprets the size parameter due to truncation. Furthermore, this flaw facilitates exploitation techniques categorized under MITRE ATT&CK T1203, Exploitation for Defense Evasion or Initial Access, depending on whether the vulnerability is leveraged to crash a service or gain initial foothold in an environment relying on automated LiDAR data processing pipelines.
Mitigation strategies should prioritize immediate updates to libLAS version 1.8.2 or later, where this integer truncation and buffer sizing logic has been corrected to handle variable length records of arbitrary size safely. For environments unable to update immediately, defensive measures include implementing strict input validation at the ingestion layer to reject .las files with schema sizes exceeding reasonable limits before they reach libLAS processing tools. Additionally, deploying memory protection mechanisms such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) can mitigate the risk of code execution resulting from heap corruption, although these do not prevent the initial denial-of-service impact caused by crashes. Security teams should also audit their LiDAR data processing workflows to ensure that only trusted sources are processed automatically without manual review or additional sanitization layers.