CVE-2026-112345 in TTLock
Summary
by MITRE • 10/26/2026
TTLock Android application before v9.8.260718 and associated smart-lock firmware contain a hardcoded static AES key vulnerability that allows an attacker within Bluetooth range to decrypt the per-pairing session key transmitted during BLE pairing. Attackers can observe the pairing exchange, recover the persistent session key using the embedded defaultKey, and forge authenticated BLE requests to unlock the device, add fingerprints or access codes, and perform administrative actions without authentication or user interaction.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/26/2026
The vulnerability identified in TTLock Android applications prior to version 9.8.260718 and associated smart-lock firmware represents a critical failure in cryptographic key management that fundamentally undermines the security of Bluetooth Low Energy communications. The core technical flaw lies in the use of a hardcoded static Advanced Encryption Standard AES key embedded directly within the application binary or firmware image. This defaultKey is utilized to derive or decrypt per-pairing session keys during the initial BLE pairing process between the mobile device and the smart lock. By relying on a single, unchanging secret for all devices rather than generating unique, random keys per unit or per user-session, the system fails to adhere to fundamental principles of secure cryptography where secrets must be unpredictable and unique to prevent mass compromise if any single instance is exposed.
From an operational perspective, this architectural weakness allows an attacker positioned within Bluetooth range to intercept the pairing exchange traffic using standard wireless sniffing tools. Because the session key derivation relies on the static defaultKey, the attacker can reverse-engineer or extract this key from the application binary through static analysis and subsequently use it to decrypt the captured per-pairing session keys transmitted during legitimate pairing events. Once the persistent session key is recovered, the cryptographic integrity of subsequent communications is nullified. The attacker gains the ability to forge authenticated BLE requests that are indistinguishable from those sent by a legitimately paired mobile application, effectively bypassing all authentication mechanisms designed to protect access control functions.
The impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized entry into secured areas. An adversary with physical proximity can not only unlock doors but also perform administrative actions such as adding new fingerprints or generating additional access codes without requiring user interaction or prior authorization. This capability allows for the establishment of persistent backdoor access, enabling long-term surveillance and control over the affected smart locks even after the initial exploit is no longer active. The lack of mutual authentication in this context means that the lock cannot verify the identity of the requesting device beyond the possession of the derived key, which is trivially obtainable by any actor with basic reverse-engineering skills and Bluetooth hardware.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, as it involves the use of a static secret that remains constant across all instances of the software or firmware product. Furthermore, in terms of offensive security frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK, this exploit maps to techniques involving Bluetooth Low Energy exploitation and credential dumping from binary artifacts. The attack vector leverages proximity-based wireless communication channels, classifying it under local network attacks where physical access is a prerequisite but no user interaction or social engineering is required for the initial compromise of cryptographic secrets.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize the immediate removal of hardcoded static keys in favor of dynamic key generation mechanisms that utilize unique device identifiers and random nonces to ensure session uniqueness. Developers should implement secure boot processes and code obfuscation techniques to make reverse-engineering more difficult, although this serves only as a secondary defense rather than a primary security control. For existing deployments, users are advised to update the TTLock application to version 9.8.260718 or later where these cryptographic flaws have been addressed by replacing static keys with properly managed dynamic secrets. Additionally, implementing mutual authentication protocols and ensuring that session keys are derived from ephemeral random values rather than persistent hardcoded constants is essential to restoring trust in the BLE communication channel and preventing unauthorized administrative actions.