CVE-2026-116819 in OpenPanel
Summary
by MITRE • 10/27/2026
OpenPanel before 3.0.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows read-level project members to obtain plaintext integration secrets because the notification.rules query skips redactIntegration. Attackers can call the notification.rules tRPC query to retrieve Slack bot tokens, webhook URLs, and authorization headers for use against external systems.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/27/2026
The identified vulnerability in OpenPanel versions prior to 3.0.0 represents a critical failure in access control logic within its internal application programming interface, specifically targeting the notification rules management functionality. This flaw stems from an improper implementation of data sanitization routines during query execution. When authenticated users with read-level permissions attempt to retrieve configuration details for notifications via the tRPC endpoint associated with notification.rules, the backend processing pipeline fails to invoke the redactIntegration function. This omission is significant because that specific function is responsible for masking sensitive credential strings before they are serialized and returned to the client application. Consequently, instead of receiving masked or null values for secret fields, users receive the raw plaintext secrets embedded within the response payload.
From a technical perspective, this issue classifies as an insecure direct object reference combined with improper access control mechanisms that fail to enforce data-level security policies. The vulnerability allows any user account possessing at least read-only privileges on a project to extract highly sensitive integration credentials. These credentials typically include Slack bot tokens, which grant broad access to messaging channels and organizational communication logs; webhook URLs, which can be exploited to inject malicious payloads into connected services; and authorization headers that may provide access to third-party APIs or internal microservices. The exploitation vector is straightforward, requiring only a standard API call with valid authentication credentials of low privilege level, making it easily automatable by threat actors who have gained initial foothold through phishing, credential stuffing, or other entry points.
The operational impact of this information disclosure vulnerability extends far beyond the immediate exposure of secrets. Attackers can leverage these stolen tokens and URLs to perform unauthorized actions on behalf of the compromised project owner. For instance, a Slack bot token could be used to scrape sensitive conversations within private channels, impersonate automated bots in team communications, or exfiltrate data shared through integrated workflows. Webhook URLs might be manipulated to send phishing messages to employees or trigger destructive automation scripts if connected to deployment pipelines. Furthermore, the exposure of authorization headers can facilitate lateral movement across internal systems that trust these tokens for authentication, potentially leading to broader network compromise and significant reputational damage due to loss of confidentiality integrity.
This vulnerability aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration CWE-200, which covers Information Exposure, as well as CWE-862, Missing Authorization, because the system fails to verify whether a read-only user should have access to sensitive data fields within an object they are permitted to view. In terms of tactical mapping, this behavior corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1530, Data from Cloud Storage Object Discovery, and potentially T1114, Email Collection, if the Slack integration is heavily utilized for internal communication. The lack of field-level access control means that privilege escalation in terms of data sensitivity occurs without any increase in user role permissions, violating the principle of least privilege fundamental to secure system design.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching and compensating controls until an upgrade can be performed. Organizations running OpenPanel versions earlier than 3.0.0 should apply the vendor-provided update immediately, as this version contains the fix for the redactIntegration function omission. In environments where upgrading is not instantly feasible, administrators should rotate all exposed integration secrets, including Slack tokens and webhook URLs, to invalidate any potentially stolen credentials. Additionally, implementing strict API gateway policies that validate response payloads against expected schemas can help detect anomalous data exposure in real-time. Future development processes must enforce code reviews focused on security implications of serialization layers and ensure that sanitization functions are consistently applied across all query paths regardless of the calling user's permission level to prevent similar logic flaws from recurring.