CVE-2026-113620 in ioFog
Summary
by MITRE • 10/20/2026
In Eclipse ioFog Controller versions 3.8.0 through 3.9.1, operator WebSocket upgrades on the exec and log routes do not verify the bearer JWT. The payload is decoded and its groups or roles are used as RBAC subjects. A self-minted token whose groups contain admin matches the built-in admin role, with no account and no RoleBinding. The attacker can open an exec or log session for a microservice or fog whose UUID they already know. HTTP routes are not affected: they verify the token before RBAC. Agent WebSockets verify the fog token and are not affected.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/20/2026
The vulnerability identified in Eclipse ioFog Controller versions 3.8.0 through 3.9.1 represents a critical authentication bypass within the WebSocket upgrade mechanism for exec and log routes. This flaw stems from an incomplete implementation of access control checks during the transition from HTTP to WebSocket protocols. Specifically, when a client initiates a WebSocket connection to execute commands or retrieve logs for a microservice or fog node, the server fails to validate the bearer JSON Web Token (JWT) presented by the client before processing the request payload. This oversight allows an attacker who possesses knowledge of the target UUIDs to establish unauthorized interactive sessions without valid credentials. The operational impact is severe, as it grants potential remote code execution capabilities and unrestricted access to sensitive system logs for any identified resource within the ioFog infrastructure.
The technical root cause lies in how the RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) subsystem interacts with WebSocket handlers compared to standard HTTP endpoints. In this architecture, incoming payloads are decoded, and their associated groups or roles are extracted to serve as subjects for authorization decisions. However, unlike the HTTP routes which correctly enforce token verification prior to any role evaluation, the WebSocket upgrade path skips this crucial step. Consequently, an attacker can craft a self-minted JWT that includes claims specifying admin-level groups. Because the system blindly trusts these decoded claims without verifying their cryptographic signature or issuer validity against trusted identity providers, the forged token matches the built-in admin role. This bypass effectively circumvents all account-based restrictions and RoleBinding configurations designed to limit administrative privileges.
From a threat modeling perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-287, which describes Improper Authentication, specifically involving authentication bypass via WebSocket protocols. It also maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as the attacker leverages forged credentials that mimic legitimate administrative access. The ability to open exec sessions implies a high risk of full system compromise on affected nodes, while log exposure facilitates reconnaissance and potential extraction of sensitive data such as API keys or internal network configurations. Since agent WebSockets are unaffected due to their distinct verification logic for fog tokens, the attack surface is limited strictly to operator-facing interfaces where UUIDs can be enumerated through other means.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching to version 3.9.2 or later, which addresses this validation gap by ensuring JWT signatures are verified before any RBAC subject extraction occurs. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, network-level controls should be implemented to restrict WebSocket upgrade requests to known administrative IP ranges using reverse proxy configurations. Additionally, implementing strict input validation and enforcing signature verification on all incoming tokens regardless of the transport protocol will prevent similar bypasses in future iterations. Security teams should also audit existing deployments for any evidence of unauthorized exec or log sessions by reviewing access logs for anomalies associated with self-minted token patterns.