CVE-2026-114083 in Trigger.dev
Summary
by MITRE • 10/22/2026
Trigger.dev before 4.5.0-rc.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the api/v1/packets and api/v2/packets endpoints that allows authenticated tenants to escape their object key prefix through an unsanitized filename splat segment. Attackers holding one valid API key can supply ../ sequences to obtain presigned GET or PUT URLs and read or overwrite other tenants' run payloads and outputs.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/22/2026
The vulnerability identified in Trigger.dev versions prior to 4.5.0-rc.3 represents a critical path traversal flaw within the application's packet management endpoints, specifically affecting api/v1/packets and api/v2/packets. This security defect stems from an insufficient sanitization of user-supplied input during the generation of presigned URLs for object storage operations. When authenticated tenants interact with these API endpoints to retrieve or upload run payloads and outputs, the system constructs file paths based on a combination of tenant-specific prefixes and provided filename segments. The core technical failure lies in the handling of unsanitized splat segments within the filename parameter, which allows an attacker to inject directory traversal sequences such as ../ into the path construction logic. Because the application fails to validate or normalize these input strings before appending them to the object key prefix, it permits navigation outside the designated tenant storage bucket boundaries.
From a technical perspective, this flaw exploits the way cloud storage services like AWS S3 handle presigned URLs and object keys. By supplying carefully crafted path traversal sequences, an authenticated user can manipulate the resulting file path to reference objects belonging to other tenants or even system-level resources that should remain inaccessible. The vulnerability is particularly severe because it does not require administrative privileges; any valid API key associated with a tenant account provides sufficient access vector to exploit this flaw. Once the presigned GET URL is generated for an arbitrary object, the attacker can download sensitive data such as execution logs, input parameters, or output results from other tenants. Conversely, if PUT operations are supported and improperly restricted, it may allow overwriting of existing objects, potentially leading to denial of service or further exploitation through malicious payload injection.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant, primarily centering on a complete breakdown of multi-tenant isolation principles. In serverless orchestration platforms like Trigger.dev, strict separation between tenant data is paramount for maintaining confidentiality and integrity across shared infrastructure. The ability to read other tenants' run payloads compromises the privacy of business logic and proprietary algorithms executed within those runs. Furthermore, if an attacker can overwrite outputs or inputs, they could corrupt execution results, leading to incorrect application behavior in downstream systems that rely on Trigger.dev's orchestration outcomes. This scenario aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, as the software does not adequately restrict access to files outside the intended directory structure. Additionally, this vulnerability maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1083: File and Directory Discovery, where an adversary uses discovered paths to locate sensitive information for exfiltration or further compromise.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate patching and rigorous input validation practices. The primary remediation is upgrading Trigger.dev to version 4.5.0-rc.3 or later, where the developers have addressed this path traversal issue by implementing proper sanitization of filename segments before they are used in object key construction. In addition to updating software components, organizations should enforce strict least-privilege access controls for API keys and ensure that presigned URL generation logic includes canonicalization checks to resolve any relative paths or dot-dot sequences into absolute, safe directories. Monitoring logs for unusual patterns of path traversal attempts can also aid in detecting exploitation activity while patches are being deployed. Security teams should review their integration with Trigger.dev to ensure no custom code bypasses these safeguards and consider implementing additional WAF rules that block common directory traversal signatures if the platform update is delayed due to operational constraints.