CVE-2026-114088 in trigger.dev
Summary
by MITRE • 10/22/2026
Trigger.dev before 4.5.4 contains a hardcoded default secret vulnerability in the /coordinator Socket.IO namespace that allows unauthenticated attackers to connect using the published coordinator-secret value. Attackers can emit READY_FOR_EXECUTION to retrieve decrypted run environment variables or send TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN and similar events to tamper with arbitrary runs.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/22/2026
The vulnerability identified in Trigger.dev versions prior to 4.5.4 represents a critical failure in authentication and access control mechanisms within the application's real-time communication layer. Specifically, the /coordinator Socket.IO namespace relies on a hardcoded default secret for session validation rather than dynamically generated or securely stored credentials. This architectural flaw allows unauthenticated actors to bypass security controls by simply utilizing the publicly known coordinator-secret value to establish valid connections with the backend service. The presence of such static secrets in production environments is a severe deviation from industry best practices, as it eliminates the ability to rotate keys and ensures that any party aware of the default string can impersonate legitimate clients indefinitely until the software version is updated or the secret is manually changed across all instances.
From a technical perspective, this flaw falls under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, which highlights the risk associated with embedding sensitive authentication data directly into source code or configuration files that may be exposed to external parties. The Socket.IO protocol facilitates bidirectional communication between clients and servers, but in this instance, the server fails to verify the identity of connecting entities beyond checking against a static token. This lack of dynamic verification means that once an attacker obtains the coordinator-secret, they are treated as a trusted peer by the system. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it affects the core coordination logic of the platform, allowing external actors to inject commands into the execution pipeline without any form of authorization check or audit trail indicating unauthorized access attempts.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted, primarily centering on data confidentiality and integrity. An attacker can exploit the established connection by emitting a READY_FOR_EXECUTION event, which triggers the system to retrieve decrypted run environment variables from memory or storage. This action effectively exposes sensitive configuration details, API keys, database credentials, and other proprietary information that are essential for the application's operation but should remain strictly confidential. Furthermore, the attacker can manipulate ongoing processes by sending events such as TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN. By injecting these false failure signals, an adversary can disrupt legitimate workflows, cause service degradation, or force retries that may lead to resource exhaustion or inconsistent data states within the platform. This capability transforms a simple information disclosure flaw into one that enables active tampering with business logic and system stability.
In terms of threat modeling, this vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Initial Access via Valid Accounts if the secret is considered equivalent to credentials, but more accurately reflects lateral movement or command injection capabilities once inside a trusted context. The ability to emit arbitrary events maps closely to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, as user-controlled input (the event payload) is processed without sufficient validation against expected behavior for unauthenticated users. This allows the attacker to influence the state machine of running tasks, potentially leading to denial of service or data corruption depending on how downstream components handle these fabricated failure signals.
To mitigate this vulnerability and prevent further exploitation, immediate remediation steps must focus on eliminating hardcoded secrets from the codebase. Developers should implement dynamic secret generation during deployment or initialization phases, ensuring that each instance receives a unique, cryptographically secure random string stored in a protected environment variable manager rather than embedded in source files. Access control lists for Socket.IO namespaces must be reviewed to ensure that only authenticated and authorized clients can interact with critical endpoints like /coordinator. Additionally, implementing strict input validation on all emitted events will help prevent the injection of malicious payloads such as TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN from unverified sources. Regular security audits and static application security testing should be integrated into the development lifecycle to detect similar hardcoding issues before they reach production environments.