CVE-2026-114089 in Trigger.dev
Summary
by MITRE • 10/22/2026
Trigger.dev before 4.5.2 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the CLI authorization-code flow because loading /account/authorization-code/<code> mints a Personal Access Token without any consent step. Attackers mint an unauthenticated code, lure a logged-in user to that URL, then retrieve the victim's PAT from the unauthenticated /api/v1/token endpoint to take over the account.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/22/2026
Trigger.dev versions prior to 4.5.2 are susceptible to a critical cross-site request forgery vulnerability within its command-line interface authorization-code flow. This flaw stems from an insecure implementation of the OAuth-like authentication mechanism where the system fails to enforce proper consent or verification steps during token generation. Specifically, when a user navigates to the endpoint /account/authorization-code/<code>, the application automatically mints a Personal Access Token associated with that session without requiring any explicit confirmation or re-authentication from the user. This design oversight allows an attacker who can control or influence the code parameter to generate valid credentials on behalf of any authenticated victim, effectively bypassing standard security controls intended to prevent unauthorized access.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it enables complete account takeover through a social engineering vector that requires minimal technical skill from the adversary. An attacker begins by generating an unauthenticated authorization code using their own session or via automated means. They then craft a malicious URL containing this specific code and lure a logged-in victim to visit the page, typically through phishing emails, compromised websites, or other deceptive links. Upon loading the endpoint, the browser executes the request in the context of the victim's active session due to how cookies and authentication states are handled by modern browsers for same-site requests. Consequently, the server issues a valid Personal Access Token linked to the victim's account without any indication that this action is occurring or requiring user approval.
Once the token is minted on behalf of the victim, it can be exfiltrated by retrieving data from the unauthenticated /api/v1/token endpoint. This endpoint appears to lack sufficient access controls, allowing anyone with knowledge of the generated code and potentially other session identifiers to fetch the resulting Personal Access Token. With this token in hand, the attacker gains full administrative or user-level privileges within the Trigger.dev platform, depending on the victim's role. This leads to potential data theft, unauthorized modifications to project configurations, execution of malicious workflows, and broader compromise of any systems integrated with the affected account. The absence of a consent step is particularly dangerous as it removes one of the primary defenses against session hijacking and credential theft in web applications.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), specifically involving state-changing requests that lack proper anti-forgery mechanisms or consent verification. It also relates to CWE-613 insufficient validation of user input regarding session management and token generation processes. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this attack vector maps to Tactic 4: Privilege Escalation under Technique T1078 Valid Accounts, where an attacker obtains legitimate credentials through deception rather than direct exploitation of a software bug in logic or memory. The use of social engineering to trigger the token minting process further connects it to techniques involving user interaction and trust manipulation.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. For organizations currently running affected versions, upgrading to Trigger.dev version 4.5.2 or later is the primary corrective action as these releases likely include patches for this specific authorization flow flaw. In the interim, administrators should enforce strict Content Security Policy headers that restrict cross-origin requests where possible and ensure that sensitive endpoints require explicit user interaction beyond mere page load events. Implementing SameSite cookie attributes with a value of Strict or Lax can help prevent browsers from sending session cookies in cross-site contexts, thereby mitigating the initial trigger mechanism. Additionally, requiring multi-factor authentication for all API token generation and access would add a critical layer of defense that cannot be bypassed by simple CSRF attacks. Regular security audits focusing on OAuth implementations and consent flows are essential to identify similar weaknesses before they can be exploited.