CVE-2026-114510 in flexible-graphrag
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2026
Flexible GraphRAG is a Python framework for building graph and retrieval-augmented generation applications across multiple graph, vector, and search backends. From 0.6.0 until 0.8.2, the _escape() helper in flexible-graphrag/langchain/graph/pg_store_adapters/falkordb_adapter.py escapes quotes before backslashes and then interpolates the result into Cypher assembled by FalkorDBAdapter.add_graph_documents, allowing an inserted escape to be doubled and a quote to terminate the string early. When GRAPH_BACKEND=langchain and GRAPH_DB=falkordb are configured, attacker-influenced ingested document content can cause the extraction model to produce malicious entity or relationship values that reach these queries, allowing injected Cypher clauses to modify or delete graph data and, when the calling code surfaces query results to the user or LLM, disclose graph data. Dynamic node and relationship type identifiers are also inserted into backtick-quoted query positions without safe parameterization. The LlamaIndex FalkorDB store is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.2.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/23/2026
The vulnerability identified within the Flexible GraphRAG framework, specifically affecting versions from 0.6.0 through 0.8.2, represents a critical SQL injection variant known as Cypher Injection. This flaw resides primarily in the FalkorDB adapter implementation located at langchain/graph/pg_store_adapters/falkordb_adapter.py. The core technical deficiency lies within the _escape() helper function and its subsequent usage during graph document ingestion. When the system is configured with GRAPH_BACKEND set to langchain and GRAPH_DB set to falkordb, the application processes ingested documents by extracting entities and relationships via a language model or extraction pipeline. These extracted values are then passed into Cypher query construction methods without adequate sanitization against injection attacks.
The specific mechanism of exploitation involves an incorrect ordering in string escaping logic. The _escape() function is designed to neutralize special characters within user-supplied data before it is interpolated into database queries. However, the implementation escapes quotes before backslashes rather than adhering to standard escape sequence protocols where backslashes are processed first or handled via parameterized queries entirely. This sequencing error allows an attacker who controls the content of ingested documents to manipulate the escaping process. By inserting a carefully crafted string containing escaped characters, such as a backslash followed by a quote, the initial escape operation can inadvertently double the backslash while leaving the quote unescaped relative to the final query structure. Consequently, when this malformed value is interpolated into the Cypher statement, the premature termination of the string literal occurs because the closing quote is interpreted as part of the data rather than as syntax delimiters.
This structural flaw enables an attacker-influenced extraction model output to inject arbitrary Cypher clauses directly into the database commands executed by FalkorDBAdapter.add_graph_documents. The operational impact is severe, granting potential attackers full read and write access to the graph database depending on the privileges of the application's database user. Attackers can modify existing node or relationship properties, delete critical data structures, or insert malicious nodes that may be subsequently processed by other parts of the system. Furthermore, if the calling code surfaces query results back to users or large language models for further processing, the vulnerability facilitates unauthorized disclosure of sensitive graph data. This transforms a simple ingestion pipeline into a vector for comprehensive database compromise and information exfiltration.
In addition to the string interpolation flaw involving quote escaping, there is a secondary issue regarding dynamic identifiers within Cypher queries. Node types and relationship types are often inserted directly into backtick-quoted positions in the query strings without safe parameterization or strict validation against reserved keywords or injection payloads. While less common than value-based injections, this allows for potential manipulation of schema-level operations if an attacker can influence how entity labels or relationship types are extracted from ingested content. This aspect aligns with CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection) and specifically maps to the ATT&CK technique T1059 Command Scripting, as it allows for the execution of arbitrary database commands through crafted input data rather than direct command-line access.
The scope of this vulnerability is limited to configurations utilizing LangChain with FalkorDB as the graph backend. The LlamaIndex implementation of the FalkorDB store within Flexible GraphRAG does not exhibit these specific flaws, indicating that the issue is isolated to particular integration paths and adapter implementations rather than a universal framework defect. This distinction highlights the importance of verifying which backend adapters are active in any given deployment environment when assessing risk exposure.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize upgrading to version 0.8.2 or later where this vulnerability has been resolved through corrected escaping logic and improved query construction practices. For environments unable to immediately upgrade, defensive coding measures should be implemented within custom adapter layers if possible. This includes implementing strict allow-listing for dynamic identifiers such as node types and relationship labels to prevent schema manipulation. Additionally, input validation on ingested document content can help filter out suspicious escape sequences before they reach the database layer. However, the most robust defense remains the adoption of parameterized queries wherever feasible, ensuring that data values are never directly interpolated into command strings regardless of escaping mechanisms. Organizations relying on Flexible GraphRAG for knowledge graph construction must treat this as a high-severity issue requiring immediate remediation to prevent unauthorized modification or exfiltration of their graph data assets.