CVE-2026-116185 in core
Summary
by MITRE • 10/25/2026
OpenRemote core before 1.31.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated users to read other realms' gateway tunnel information via getGatewayActiveTunnelInfos. Attackers can request the gateway tunnel endpoint with their own realm and a victim gateway ID to disclose internal target hosts, ports, and routing data.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/25/2026
The OpenRemote platform, prior to version 1.31.0, contains a critical authorization bypass vulnerability within its core architecture that compromises the integrity of multi-tenant isolation mechanisms. This flaw specifically affects the getGatewayActiveTunnelInfos endpoint, which is designed to retrieve information about active gateway tunnels for administrative or monitoring purposes. The underlying technical deficiency lies in the insufficient validation of realm boundaries during request processing. While the system correctly authenticates users and verifies their membership within a specific tenant realm, it fails to enforce strict access control checks when querying tunnel data associated with other realms. This allows an authenticated user operating under one realm context to issue requests that reference gateway identifiers belonging to entirely different organizational units or tenants.
From a technical perspective, the vulnerability stems from a lack of proper object-level authorization checks on the server side. When a client submits a request containing a specific gateway ID, the backend logic retrieves the corresponding tunnel information without verifying whether the requesting user's realm matches the realm associated with that gateway ID. This oversight enables attackers to perform unauthorized data retrieval by manipulating input parameters. By supplying their own valid authentication credentials and realm context alongside a victim gateway identifier obtained through enumeration or other means, an attacker can successfully query sensitive infrastructure details. The API endpoint returns comprehensive tunnel metadata including internal target host addresses, port numbers, and routing configurations that should remain strictly confined to the owning realm's administrators.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for organizations utilizing OpenRemote in multi-tenant environments where strict data segregation is required. Disclosure of gateway tunnel information exposes critical network topology details such as private IP addresses, service ports, and connection endpoints. This intelligence can be leveraged by malicious actors to map internal networks, identify vulnerable services running on specific hosts, or plan further targeted attacks against infrastructure components that are not directly exposed to the public internet. In scenarios where OpenRemote manages industrial control systems or critical IoT deployments, such exposure could facilitate lateral movement within a network or enable disruption of operational technology processes by revealing precise connection points for gateway tunnels.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and falls under MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, as exploitation requires valid authentication credentials but abuses them to access resources outside the intended scope. To mitigate this risk, organizations running OpenRemote versions earlier than 1.31.0 must upgrade immediately to the patched version where proper realm isolation checks have been implemented in the getGatewayActiveTunnelInfos endpoint. Until an upgrade is feasible, administrators should restrict network access to the affected API endpoints using firewall rules or reverse proxy configurations that limit exposure to trusted internal networks only. Additionally implementing strict logging and monitoring for unusual patterns of gateway ID queries across different realms can help detect potential exploitation attempts early in the attack lifecycle.