CVE-2026-117559 in DroidMind
Summary
by MITRE • 10/27/2026
DroidMind through 0.4.0 contains a command injection vulnerability that allows MCP clients to bypass the shell command allowlist by using $(...) or backtick substitution. Attackers, including prompt-injected agents, can inject commands through parameters interpolated into Device.run_shell() or unvalidated Device.list_directory() to run blocked commands such as reboot on connected Android devices.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/27/2026
The vulnerability identified in DroidMind versions up to 0.4.0 represents a critical command injection flaw that undermines the security controls designed to restrict shell operations on connected Android devices. This issue stems from insufficient input validation and improper handling of user-supplied data within core device management functions, specifically Device.run_shell() and Device.list_directory(). The architecture relies on an allowlist mechanism intended to permit only specific, safe shell commands while blocking dangerous operations such as system reboots or arbitrary command execution. However, the implementation fails to adequately sanitize inputs before they are passed to the underlying operating system's command interpreter, creating a significant security gap that allows malicious actors to bypass these restrictions through standard shell metacharacter substitution techniques.
The technical root cause lies in how parameters are interpolated into shell commands without proper escaping or context-aware validation. Attackers can exploit this by utilizing $(...) subshell execution syntax or backtick `...` substitution, which are interpreted by the Bourne shell and its derivatives before the command is executed. When a parameter containing these characters is passed to Device.run_shell(), the system does not isolate the intended argument from executable code. Instead, it processes the entire string as a single command line, allowing an attacker to append arbitrary commands after legitimate ones or replace them entirely using substitution operators. This behavior effectively neutralizes the allowlist protection because the shell interprets the injected syntax before any application-level filtering can take effect, leading to the execution of unauthorized system operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in environments where DroidMind manages fleets of Android devices for remote administration or testing purposes. An attacker who gains access to an MCP client interface, potentially through prompt injection attacks against AI-driven agents interacting with the platform, can execute arbitrary commands on the target device. This includes high-impact actions such as rebooting the device, which causes service disruption and potential data loss if unsaved work is present. Beyond simple denial of service, the ability to run blocked commands opens the door for further exploitation, including privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or using the compromised Android device as a pivot point within a broader network infrastructure. The vulnerability affects both direct command execution via Device.run_shell() and indirect execution through directory listing operations that may be leveraged in conjunction with other file system interactions to achieve code execution.
This flaw aligns closely with CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly known as OS Command Injection. The specific technique of using $(...) or backticks for bypassing allowlists is a classic example of how naive string concatenation fails against shell parsing rules. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability facilitates T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter exploitation, allowing adversaries to execute commands via system shells like sh or bash. It also relates to T1622 Tool Discovery if used in conjunction with directory listing functions to map out available tools on the device for further lateral movement. The presence of prompt-injected agents as a potential attack vector highlights the intersection of traditional software vulnerabilities and emerging AI security risks, where malicious prompts can be crafted to trick automated systems into performing unintended actions that trigger this underlying code injection flaw.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust input validation and secure coding practices within the DroidMind application layer. Developers should avoid passing user-supplied data directly to shell interpreters whenever possible. Instead of using system-level command execution functions, it is recommended to use language-specific APIs or libraries that perform actions without invoking a shell interpreter, thereby eliminating the possibility of metacharacter interpretation. If shell invocation is strictly necessary for specific legacy functionality, inputs must be rigorously validated against an allowlist using strict pattern matching rather than simple string inclusion checks. Additionally, employing parameterized execution methods where arguments are passed as distinct array elements to execve or similar low-level functions can prevent the shell from parsing injected syntax. Upgrading to a patched version of DroidMind that addresses this interpolation flaw is essential for restoring security boundaries and preventing unauthorized command execution on managed Android devices.