CVE-2026-119623 in TYPO3info

Summary

by MITRE • 11/17/2026

The installer (first installation wizard) could be re-enabled on an already configured instance by placing a file whose name starts with FIRST_INSTALL in the public web root or the project root. The installer then became accessible without authentication, allowing for example to change the database connection and to create a new administrator and system maintainer account, which leads to remote code execution. As demonstrated in TYPO3-CORE-SA-2026-026, such a file could be created by an authenticated, low-privileged backend user without any further permissions. Other ways of creating files in the web root, as well as leftover or restored marker files, could be abused in the same way.

With the fixed versions, the installer can no longer be re-enabled on an already configured instance by a marker file. A new internal setting $GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['SYS']['isInstalling'] is stored in the system configuration and is only enabled while a new installation is running. Additionally, only the exact file names FIRST_INSTALL and FIRST_INSTALL.txt are accepted as marker files.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/17/2026

The vulnerability described involves a critical flaw in the TYPO3 content management system's installer mechanism, specifically affecting how the initial setup wizard handles re-initialization on already configured instances. The core technical issue stems from an insecure reliance on filesystem markers to control access to administrative functions. Specifically, if a file with a name starting with FIRST_INSTALL is placed within the public web root or the project root directory, the application incorrectly interprets this as a signal that the system requires initial configuration. This logic error bypasses standard authentication protocols, rendering the installer accessible without any credentials. The flaw exploits the assumption that such marker files are only present during legitimate first-time installations, failing to account for scenarios where these files might be created by malicious actors or left behind from previous operations.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the high privileges associated with the installer interface. Once an attacker gains access through the aforementioned mechanism, they can modify critical system configurations, including database connection strings and security settings. Most critically, the installer allows for the creation of new administrator and system maintainer accounts. By establishing a foothold as a privileged user, an attacker effectively achieves remote code execution capabilities within the context of the web server process. This level of access enables full compromise of the underlying infrastructure, including data exfiltration, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement across connected systems. The severity is further amplified by the fact that this can be triggered by authenticated low-privileged backend users who possess basic file creation permissions in specific directories, significantly lowering the barrier to entry for exploitation compared to unauthenticated attacks.

Industry standards classify this vulnerability under CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-613 Insufficient Session Expiration or Termination, as it involves unauthorized access to administrative functions due to flawed state management. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK framework techniques, this aligns with T1078 Valid Accounts for initial access via compromised credentials and T1136 Create Account for persistence through the creation of new privileged accounts. The attack vector leverages local file manipulation to escalate privileges remotely, highlighting a failure in enforcing strict separation between operational state markers and executable application logic.

Mitigation strategies focus on hardening the installer's activation criteria and restricting filesystem permissions. As implemented in fixed versions, the system now utilizes an internal configuration setting stored within $GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['SYS']['isInstalling'] to track installation status dynamically rather than relying solely on static file markers. This approach ensures that the installer is only enabled during active, verified new installations. Furthermore, strict validation of marker filenames has been introduced, accepting only exact matches for FIRST_INSTALL and FIRST_INSTALL.txt, thereby preventing exploitation via files with similar but distinct names. Administrators should also enforce restrictive filesystem permissions to prevent low-privileged users from creating arbitrary files in the web root or project directories where such markers could be placed. Regular auditing of directory contents can help detect any residual marker files that might have been left behind by previous installations or backups, ensuring they do not inadvertently trigger the vulnerability on live systems.

Responsible

TYPO3

Reservation

10/30/2026

Disclosure

11/17/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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