CVE-2026-122124 in UVC40 E2
Summary
by MITRE • 11/04/2026
On Yealink UVC40 E2 devices before 319.410.0.71, an attacker with short-term physical access can steal Wi‑Fi credentials via the USB interface. Sensitive data within the firmware configuration can be abused to gain root privileges on the device. Within Wi‑Fi coverage, the attacker may perform audio and video eavesdropping with no LED alert from the device.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/04/2026
The vulnerability identified in Yealink UVC40 E2 devices prior to version 319.410.0.71 represents a critical failure in physical security controls and firmware integrity, allowing an attacker with short-term physical access to compromise the entire system. This flaw is primarily categorized under CWE-528, which relates to exposure of password information to unauthorized users, but it also encompasses elements of CWE-345 regarding insufficient verification of data authenticity and trust relationships. The core technical issue lies in how the device handles its configuration files stored within the firmware partition. These configuration files contain sensitive credentials, including Wi-Fi passwords and potentially other authentication tokens required for network connectivity. Because these secrets are not adequately protected against extraction via physical interfaces such as USB, an attacker can bypass logical access controls entirely by exploiting the hardware interface directly. This highlights a significant gap in the device's secure boot or firmware verification processes, which should ideally prevent unauthorized modification or reading of critical configuration data even when physical ports are accessible.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted. Once an attacker gains root privileges on the device by abusing the exposed sensitive data from the firmware configuration, they achieve full control over the endpoint. This level of access allows for persistent backdooring, where the attacker can modify system binaries or startup scripts to ensure continued access even after reboots. Furthermore, the compromise extends beyond mere credential theft. With root privileges and physical proximity within Wi-Fi coverage, an adversary can activate audio and video eavesdropping capabilities without triggering any visual indicators such as LED alerts. This stealthy surveillance capability poses a direct threat to privacy and confidentiality, particularly in corporate or sensitive environments where these devices are deployed for conferencing purposes. The lack of user notification mechanisms means that victims remain unaware of the intrusion until significant damage has been done or data exfiltrated.
From an offensive security perspective, this vulnerability aligns with several tactics within the MITRE ATT&CK framework. The initial access via physical USB interface corresponds to T1095 (Non-Application Layer Protocol) and potentially T1234 (Direct Hardware Access). The exploitation of firmware configuration data for privilege escalation falls under T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), while the subsequent eavesdropping activity maps directly to T1056.001 (Input Capture: Keylogging) and T1059.007 (Command and Scripting Interpreter if scripts are used to facilitate surveillance). The stealth aspect of operating without LED alerts also reflects techniques aimed at avoiding detection, such as those found in the Defense Evasion tactics like T1070 (Indicator Removal on Host), although here it is more about hardware-level suppression of status indicators.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The most urgent action is to apply the firmware update to version 319.410.0.71 or later, which addresses these specific flaws in credential storage and access control mechanisms. Organizations should also implement physical security measures such as locking device ports with USB locks or using port-blocking devices when the equipment is unattended. Additionally, network segmentation can help limit the blast radius if a device is compromised by isolating IoT and conferencing hardware from critical corporate networks. Future procurement decisions should prioritize vendors who demonstrate robust secure development lifecycles, including rigorous testing for physical attack vectors and ensuring that sensitive data like Wi-Fi credentials are encrypted at rest using strong cryptographic standards rather than stored in plaintext or weakly obfuscated formats within firmware configurations.