CVE-2026-129803 in SOESinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/21/2026

The CoE entry gate accepts frames with mbxheader.length as low as COE_MINIMUM_LENGTH (8), but a normal SDO Download requires at least COE_HEADERSIZE (10) bytes of CoE payload to carry its header fields. With mbxheader.length of 8 or 9, the segmented-transfer branch misevaluates due to unsigned wrap, leaving the declared SDO size unclamped. copy2mbx then reads that many bytes starting past the end of the actual payload and writes them into the object buffer.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026

The vulnerability described constitutes a critical out-of-bounds read condition within the CANopen EtherCAT CoE (CANopen over EtherCAT) implementation, specifically affecting the entry gate mechanism responsible for handling Service Data Object SDO transactions. The core technical flaw stems from an insufficient validation of the mbxheader.length field when processing incoming frames that trigger segmented transfer logic or specific download operations. While standard protocol specifications dictate that a normal SDO Download requires at least COE_HEADERSIZE, which is ten bytes, to properly encapsulate necessary header fields and data pointers, the vulnerable implementation accepts frames with lengths as low as COE_MINIMUM_LENGTH, defined here as eight bytes. This discrepancy creates a scenario where the system processes malformed or truncated packets that do not conform to expected structural integrity requirements for SDO downloads.

The operational impact of this flaw is driven by an unsigned integer wrap-around error within the segmented-transfer branch of the code execution path. When the mbxheader.length value falls between eight and nine bytes, it fails to meet the minimum threshold required for valid header parsing but passes broader length checks that do not account for the specific payload requirements of SDO operations. Consequently, arithmetic operations involving this undersized length field result in an unsigned wrap, causing the system to miscalculate the amount of data expected or available. This calculation error leaves the declared size of the SDO transaction unclamped and incorrectly inflated relative to the actual buffer contents. The logic fails to enforce boundary constraints that would normally prevent access beyond allocated memory regions associated with the current packet payload.

Following this misevaluation, the copy2mbx function proceeds to execute a memory read operation based on these erroneous size parameters. It attempts to read a number of bytes starting from an offset past the end of the actual available payload data contained within the received frame. This action results in reading arbitrary memory contents that reside immediately after the packet buffer in system memory. These uninitialized or sensitive memory values are then written into the object buffer, which is part of the internal state management for the CoE communication stack. This out-of-bounds read can lead to information disclosure by leaking kernel or application memory data to external entities if the compromised object buffer is subsequently transmitted back over the network. Furthermore, depending on how the leaked data influences subsequent control flow or variable states, it may facilitate further exploitation vectors such as logic bypasses or denial of service conditions through state corruption.

From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read and CWE-369 Divide By Zero involving an unsigned integer wrap-around in the context of length validation failures. In terms of adversary tactics, it relates to ATT&CK technique T1005 Data from Local System which describes scenarios where attackers gather data directly from local systems through memory reads rather than file system access. The lack of strict boundary checking on protocol-specific header lengths allows an attacker with network access to the EtherCAT bus to craft malicious frames that exploit this logic error, potentially gaining unauthorized visibility into internal system states or causing instability in real-time control applications dependent on deterministic CoE communication.

Mitigation strategies must focus on rigorous input validation and stricter adherence to protocol specifications within the embedded firmware or driver layer handling these packets. Developers should implement explicit checks ensuring that mbxheader.length meets or exceeds COE_HEADERSIZE before any processing logic is invoked, particularly for SDO Download operations. Additionally, implementing bounds checking in the copy2mbx routine would prevent memory reads beyond the allocated payload buffer regardless of header length anomalies. Updating to patched versions of the CoE stack provided by the vendor is essential if available, as these updates typically include corrected validation routines that properly clamp size variables and reject malformed frames early in the processing pipeline. Network segmentation and monitoring can also serve as compensating controls to detect anomalous frame sizes or unexpected memory access patterns indicative of exploitation attempts against this vulnerability.

Responsible

Rt-labs

Reservation

11/16/2026

Disclosure

11/21/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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