CVE-2026-129882 in Kiwi TCMS
Summary
by MITRE • 11/16/2026
Kiwi TCMS before 17.1 contains a hard-coded cryptographic key vulnerability that allows remote attackers to forge signed data by using the publicly known Django SECRET_KEY in tcms/settings/common.py. Attackers can forge or tamper with signed cookie-based messages and django.core.signing payloads, weakening password-reset and session-authentication HMACs on deployments keeping the default.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026
The vulnerability identified in Kiwi TCMS versions prior to 17.1 represents a critical failure in cryptographic key management, specifically categorized under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials. The root cause lies in the application's configuration file, tcms/settings/common.py, where the Django SECRET_KEY is hardcoded rather than being dynamically generated or retrieved from secure environment variables during deployment. This design decision results in a static secret value that remains constant across all installations using default settings. In cryptographic systems, particularly those utilizing HMAC-based message authentication codes for session management and password reset tokens, the secrecy of the key is paramount to ensuring data integrity and authenticity. When this key is publicly known or easily discoverable through source code inspection, the fundamental security guarantee provided by these mechanisms is nullified.
From a technical perspective, Django relies on its SECRET_KEY to sign various components of web requests, most notably signed cookies and payloads generated via django.core.signing. These signatures serve as proof that the data has not been altered in transit and originates from a trusted source. By possessing the hard-coded key, an attacker can independently generate valid cryptographic signatures for arbitrary data structures. This capability allows for the forgery of session tokens and password reset links without requiring any prior authentication or access to user credentials. The attack vector is remote and does not require complex exploitation techniques beyond basic knowledge of Django's signing mechanism, making it highly accessible to automated scanning tools and opportunistic attackers alike.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe for organizations maintaining default configurations. Session-authentication HMACs are compromised, meaning an attacker can forge session cookies that the application will accept as valid. This effectively allows unauthorized access to user accounts by impersonating legitimate users or escalating privileges if administrative roles are involved. Furthermore, password-reset mechanisms rely on signed tokens to verify the legitimacy of a reset request. With the ability to forge these signatures, an attacker can create valid password reset links for any email address associated with a Kiwi TCMS account, thereby gaining full control over those accounts without needing access to the user's email inbox. This undermines both confidentiality and integrity within the application ecosystem.
Mitigation strategies must focus on eliminating the reliance on static secrets. The primary remediation is to upgrade to version 17.1 or later of Kiwi TCMS, where this hard-coded key issue has been addressed in favor of more secure configuration practices. For deployments that cannot immediately upgrade, administrators should override the default SECRET_KEY by setting it via environment variables or a separate configuration file that is not included in source control repositories. It is also critical to rotate any secrets if they were previously exposed and to audit logs for signs of session forgery or unauthorized password resets. Aligning with industry standards such as OWASP ASVS, which mandates the use of unique, random secret keys per deployment, ensures long-term resilience against similar cryptographic failures.