CVE-2026-133648 in Flowintelinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/20/2026

Flowintel disabled TLS certificate verification for all MISP API connections and used unverified SSL contexts for IMAP and SMTP STARTTLS mail connections. This allowed an on-path (man-in-the-middle) attacker positioned between Flowintel and its MISP or mail servers to impersonate the remote server and intercept sensitive data.

Affected connections include: - All MISP HTTPS API calls (event retrieval, attribute search, event creation, connectivity checks, and API validation) - SMTP STARTTLS connections used for sending email notifications - IMAP TLS connections used for fetching mail archives and testing connectivity

An attacker who can observe or intercept network traffic between Flowintel and the MISP or mail server could: - Capture MISP API keys and mail credentials (SMTP/IMAP passwords) - Read all threat intelligence data exchanged (events, attributes, objects, reports) - Inject or modify threat intelligence data returned to Flowintel

The vulnerability required no authentication on the part of the attacker and no user interaction; it was exploitable by any party with a network position between Flowintel and its configured MISP or mail endpoints.

Affected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026

Flowintel, prior to version 4.1.0, contained a critical security misconfiguration involving the handling of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates for external service connections. The software was found to have disabled TLS certificate verification for all API interactions with MISP servers and utilized unverified SSL contexts for IMAP and SMTP STARTTLS mail connections. This configuration error effectively nullified one of the primary mechanisms of secure communication: server authentication. By accepting any valid or invalid certificate presented by a remote endpoint, Flowintel failed to ensure that it was communicating with the intended legitimate service provider rather than an impersonator.

The technical flaw resides in the application's network stack implementation where SSL context parameters were configured to ignore hostname and certificate validation checks. In standard secure communications, a client must verify that the server's presented X.509 certificate is signed by a trusted Certificate Authority and matches the expected domain name. The absence of these checks means that Flowintel would establish an encrypted tunnel with any entity responding on the specified ports, regardless of identity proof. This creates a classic blind trust scenario where encryption provides confidentiality but no integrity or authenticity guarantees against active network adversaries.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its broad scope across multiple critical integration points. All MISP HTTPS API calls are affected, including event retrieval, attribute searches, new event creation, connectivity checks, and API validation processes. Additionally, the SMTP STARTTLS connections used for sending email notifications and IMAP TLS connections for fetching mail archives or testing connectivity were similarly vulnerable. An attacker positioned on-path between Flowintel and these remote servers can perform a man-in-the-middle attack without requiring any prior authentication credentials from the victim side. This lack of prerequisite access lowers the barrier to exploitation significantly, allowing anyone with network visibility in that segment to launch attacks.

Exploitation of this flaw allows an adversary to intercept sensitive data flowing through these channels. Specifically, attackers can capture MISP API keys and mail server passwords transmitted during authentication phases within the TLS handshake or subsequent commands if not protected by other means. Furthermore, all threat intelligence data exchanged between Flowintel and its MISP instance is exposed. This includes highly sensitive events, attributes, objects, and reports that constitute valuable cyber defense information. Beyond passive interception, an attacker can actively inject or modify threat intelligence data returned to Flowintel. Such manipulation could lead to the ingestion of false positives, misleading indicators of compromise, or malicious payloads disguised as legitimate threat feeds, thereby degrading the quality of security operations and potentially causing automated defenses to act incorrectly.

This vulnerability aligns with CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation, which describes failures in validating certificates during TLS connections. It also maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts if credentials are stolen, but more accurately reflects the broader category of Man-in-the-Middle attacks under T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle. The ability to intercept and modify traffic without detection poses a significant risk to data integrity and confidentiality in automated threat intelligence sharing environments.

To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations running Flowintel versions prior to 4.1.0 must upgrade immediately to version 4.1.0 or later where these certificate validation checks have been restored. Until the upgrade is performed, network-level mitigations should be considered, such as restricting access to MISP and mail servers via firewall rules that limit connections only from known Flowintel IP addresses. Additionally, implementing mutual TLS (mTLS) can provide an additional layer of authentication if supported by both ends of the connection. Regular monitoring for anomalous certificate changes or unexpected network traffic patterns between these services is also recommended to detect potential exploitation attempts in environments where immediate patching may be delayed.

Responsible

CIRCL

Reservation

11/20/2026

Disclosure

11/20/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00418

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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