CVE-2026-134756 in Portainer
Summary
by MITRE • 11/22/2026
Portainer Community Edition and Business Edition 2.39.0 before 2.45.1 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability because user-supplied URLs are only syntax-checked by validate.IsURL without resolved address validation. Authenticated users can abuse Git cloning, Helm retrieval, registry ping, or the GitLab proxy to reach loopback, internal, and cloud metadata addresses, probing ports and reading responses.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/22/2026
The vulnerability identified in Portainer Community Edition and Business Edition versions prior to 2.45.1 represents a critical server-side request forgery flaw rooted in insufficient input validation mechanisms for user-supplied URLs. The core technical deficiency lies within the validate.IsURL function, which performs only syntactic checks on provided URL strings without implementing any form of resolved address validation or network-level restrictions. This architectural oversight allows authenticated users to manipulate internal routing logic by supplying maliciously crafted URLs that bypass standard security controls. Because the application does not verify whether the target IP addresses are private, loopback, or associated with cloud metadata services, it proceeds to execute requests against these restricted destinations as if they were public internet resources.
This lack of destination validation enables attackers to exploit several specific features within the Portainer interface, including Git cloning operations, Helm chart retrieval processes, registry ping functionalities, and the GitLab proxy service. By leveraging these entry points, an authenticated adversary can direct the server to initiate connections toward internal network segments, local host interfaces, or cloud provider metadata endpoints such as AWS EC2 instance metadata services. The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it allows for extensive network reconnaissance within the target environment. Attackers can probe open ports on internal systems and read sensitive responses returned by these services, potentially exposing configuration details, credentials stored in metadata stores, or other critical infrastructure information that should remain isolated from external access vectors.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), specifically illustrating the failure to validate resolved addresses against a deny list of private IP ranges. The exploitation technique maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Discovery and Collection, particularly T1046 Network Service Scanning for port probing and T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account for exfiltrating data via cloud metadata services. The ability to reach loopback addresses also highlights risks associated with local service exploitation, where internal applications running on localhost may be accessed without authentication if they lack their own network-level protections.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate version upgrades to Portainer 2.45.1 or later, which address this validation gap by implementing robust IP allow-listing and deny-listing mechanisms for outbound requests. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, administrators should implement strict egress filtering at the network perimeter using firewalls or cloud security groups to block outbound connections from Portainer containers to private IP ranges such as 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, and 192.168.0.0/16, as well as link-local addresses like 169.254.169.254 commonly used for cloud metadata. Additionally, deploying web application firewalls with SSRF detection capabilities can provide an additional layer of defense by inspecting outbound request patterns and blocking attempts to access internal resources. Regular auditing of user permissions is also recommended to ensure that only trusted individuals have the ability to trigger these specific Git and Helm operations within the Portainer interface.