CVE-2026-134354 in Rclone
Summary
by MITRE • 11/21/2026
rclone from 1.59.0 before 1.76.0 contains a confinement escape in the local backend's setXattr function that lets attackers write user.* extended attributes outside the destination root via a planted symlink. Attackers who plant a symlink to an outside directory with a pre-existing child can use --links --metadata operations to set attacker-chosen user.* xattrs on files outside the destination.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026
The vulnerability identified in rclone versions prior to 1.76.0 represents a critical security flaw within the local backend's handling of extended attributes, specifically affecting the setXattr function when operating under symlink preservation modes. This issue stems from an improper confinement mechanism that fails to validate file paths against the designated destination root directory before applying metadata changes. When users employ the --links flag in conjunction with --metadata operations, rclone attempts to replicate symbolic links and their associated extended attributes on the target system. However, due to a lack of rigorous path canonicalization or chroot-style isolation during this process, the application does not adequately prevent traversal outside the intended directory structure if maliciously crafted symlinks are present in the source data.
The technical root cause lies in how the software resolves symbolic links prior to applying extended attribute modifications. An attacker who has control over the input files can plant a symlink within the source archive or directory that points to an arbitrary location on the local filesystem, such as /etc/shadow or other sensitive system directories. Crucially, this attack vector requires that the target of the symlink already possesses child elements or is structured in a way that allows the setXattr operation to succeed without triggering immediate permission errors that might otherwise reveal the misconfiguration. By exploiting this condition, an attacker can force rclone to write user.* extended attributes to files located outside the destination root directory. This effectively bypasses the expected sandboxing behavior of the tool, allowing for unauthorized modification of file metadata in restricted areas of the operating system.
From a security impact perspective, while writing extended attributes may not directly lead to arbitrary code execution or immediate privilege escalation on all systems, it constitutes a significant integrity violation and can facilitate further attacks depending on how other applications interpret these attributes. Extended attributes are often used by various daemons for storing access control lists, encryption keys, or application-specific metadata. Corrupting or injecting malicious data into system files via this vector could disrupt service availability, interfere with security policies enforced by SELinux or AppArmor if those systems rely on specific xattr values, or serve as a foothold for more complex exploitation chains in environments where file attributes are tightly coupled to execution permissions. This aligns closely with CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory and CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path, highlighting the failure to restrict operations within an expected boundary.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability primarily involve upgrading rclone to version 1.76.0 or later, where the developers have addressed the confinement escape by implementing stricter path validation checks before executing setXattr calls on symlinked targets. Administrators should also audit their usage of the --links and --metadata flags when processing untrusted input sources. In scenarios where upgrading is not immediately feasible, it is advisable to avoid using these combined options with data from unknown or potentially malicious origins. Additionally, employing operating system-level protections such as mandatory access control systems can help mitigate the impact by restricting which processes are allowed to modify extended attributes on sensitive files, thereby adding a layer of defense-in-depth against this type of path traversal and metadata injection attack. This incident underscores the importance of rigorous input validation in tools that interact deeply with the local filesystem, particularly when handling complex file structures like symlinks.