CVE-2026-134460 in jwt-frameworkinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/21/2026

web-token jwt-framework 1.2.0 before 3.4.10, jwt-experimental before 3.4.10, 4.0.x before 4.0.7, and 4.1.x before 4.1.7 contain a missing integrity check in the experimental Chacha20Poly1305 key-encryption algorithm, which discards the Poly1305 tag in encryptKey() and calls openssl_decrypt() without it in decryptKey(). Attackers on the token path can modify the encrypted content encryption key undetected.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026

The web-token jwt-framework library, encompassing versions 1.2.0 through 3.4.9 as well as experimental branches prior to 3.4.10 and major version lines 4.0.x before 4.0.7 and 4.1.x before 4.1.7, suffers from a critical cryptographic implementation flaw within its handling of the ChaCha20-Poly1305 key-encryption algorithm. This vulnerability stems from a missing integrity check that fundamentally compromises the security guarantees provided by authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD). In standard AEAD operations such as those defined in RFC 8439, the Poly1305 tag is essential for verifying both the confidentiality and authenticity of the encrypted payload. The flaw manifests specifically during the key-encryption phase where the library fails to properly validate this authentication tag before proceeding with decryption or encryption routines.

During the encryptKey operation, the implementation discards the generated Poly1305 integrity tag rather than appending it to the ciphertext output as required by the specification. This omission means that any subsequent data encrypted using this method lacks a mechanism for recipients to verify its origin or lack of tampering. More critically, in the decryptKey function, the library invokes openssl_decrypt without passing or validating an authentication tag parameter. By omitting the verification step, the decryption process proceeds blindly on whatever ciphertext is provided by the caller, effectively treating the ChaCha20 stream cipher as a standalone encryption primitive rather than part of an authenticated scheme. This architectural oversight removes all assurances regarding data integrity for keys encrypted via this specific algorithm path.

The operational impact of this vulnerability allows attackers positioned within the token processing pipeline to perform undetected modifications to the encrypted content encryption key (CEK). Since the Poly1305 tag is not verified, an adversary can alter bits in the ciphertext corresponding to the CEK without triggering any authentication failure errors. If the application relies on the integrity of this decrypted key for subsequent cryptographic operations, such as signing or encrypting user data, the attacker may be able to manipulate the resulting security outcomes. For instance, if the compromised CEK is used to sign JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), an attacker could potentially forge tokens with elevated privileges or altered claims by exploiting weaknesses in how the manipulated key interacts with downstream signature algorithms. This constitutes a severe breach of integrity that undermines trust in any system depending on this library for secure token generation and validation.

This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-345, which describes Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, as well as CWE-829, the Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere, given that the flaw allows external manipulation of critical cryptographic material. From an ATT&CK perspective, this weakness facilitates techniques related to Defense Evasion and Privilege Escalation by allowing adversaries to bypass integrity checks and alter security-critical parameters without detection. The failure to implement proper AEAD semantics represents a fundamental deviation from secure coding practices recommended for modern cryptography libraries.

Mitigation requires immediate upgrading of the web-token jwt-framework library to version 3.4.10 or later, as well as ensuring that experimental branches are updated past 3.4.10 and major versions 4.x are patched beyond their respective minor release thresholds (4.0.7 for the 4.0 branch and 4.1.7 for the 4.1 branch). These updates correct the implementation of ChaCha20-Poly1305 by ensuring that authentication tags are properly generated during encryption and rigorously verified before decryption proceeds. Organizations relying on this framework should audit their dependency trees to confirm they are not using vulnerable versions in production environments. Additionally, developers should review any custom implementations or wrappers around these cryptographic functions to ensure no similar omissions exist elsewhere in the codebase where authenticated encryption is expected but integrity checks are bypassed.

Responsible

VulnCheck

Reservation

11/21/2026

Disclosure

11/21/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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