CVE-2026-14254 in Delphix
Summary
by MITRE • 07/16/2026
A race condition in the account lockout mechanism in Delphix Continous Data allowed the lockout threshold to be bypassed through concurrent authentication requests. Parallel login attempts were processed before the failed-login counter and lockout status were updated, defeating brute-force protections and enabling continued password guessing against a targeted account.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/16/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical race condition within Delphix Continuous Data's account lockout mechanism that fundamentally undermines authentication security controls. The flaw occurs when multiple concurrent authentication requests are processed simultaneously, creating a temporal window where the system fails to properly synchronize the failed login counter and account lockout status updates. This architectural weakness allows malicious actors to exploit the timing gap between request processing and state synchronization, effectively bypassing the intended brute-force protection mechanisms.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from inadequate concurrency control within the authentication flow. When multiple login attempts occur in rapid succession, the system processes these requests before updating the internal failed attempt counters and lockout statuses. This creates a scenario where an attacker can submit numerous parallel authentication requests that all succeed before the system recognizes that threshold has been exceeded. The underlying issue aligns with CWE-367, which addresses time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilities, though specifically manifests as a race condition rather than traditional TOCTOU.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability creates a severe security risk by enabling extended password guessing attacks against targeted accounts. The bypassed lockout mechanism essentially removes the primary deterrent that would normally prevent automated brute-force attempts from succeeding. Attackers can systematically test multiple password combinations without encountering account lockouts, significantly increasing their chances of successful credential compromise. This weakness directly impacts the principle of least privilege and undermines the organization's ability to protect against credential-based attacks.
The implications extend beyond simple account compromise as this vulnerability enables more sophisticated attack vectors including credential stuffing and password spraying campaigns. Security professionals should recognize this as a critical issue that requires immediate attention, particularly in environments where Delphix Continuous Data is deployed for data protection and management. The vulnerability demonstrates poor adherence to security best practices around concurrent request handling and state management within authentication systems.
Organizations should implement mitigations focusing on proper concurrency control mechanisms including atomic operations for failed login counting and lockout status updates. The solution requires ensuring that all authentication requests within a specific time window are properly synchronized before updating account states. Additionally, implementing circuit breaker patterns or request queuing mechanisms can prevent the race condition from occurring in the first place. This vulnerability highlights the importance of following security guidelines from frameworks such as NIST SP 800-63B and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1110 for Brute Force and credential stuffing attacks, emphasizing that organizations must address timing-based security flaws to maintain effective authentication controls.
The root cause analysis reveals that this vulnerability represents a fundamental flaw in the system's architecture rather than a simple coding error. Proper implementation would require database-level locking mechanisms or distributed consensus protocols to ensure that failed login attempts are properly accounted for before any account lockout decisions are made. This type of vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it can remain undetected for extended periods while providing attackers with unlimited opportunities to guess credentials against protected accounts.