CVE-2026-14495 in DoLogin Security Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 07/08/2026
The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness in all versions up to, and including, 4.3. The vulnerability exists because `dologin\s::rrand()` seeds the Mersenne Twister with `mt_srand((double) microtime() * 1000000)` — discarding the integer-seconds component of `microtime()` and constraining the seed to a range of approximately 10^6 values (~20 bits of entropy) — after which every character of the 32-character magic-link token is drawn sequentially with `mt_rand()`, making the entire token a deterministic function of that seed. Because `Pswdless::try_login()` is registered on the unauthenticated `init` hook, resolves the target account by the auto-increment numeric ID embedded in the `?dologin=<id>.<hash>` parameter, performs the hash comparison using a non-constant-time `!=` operator, and then calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` directly — never passing through `wp_authenticate()` and therefore never triggering the plugin's own `Auth::_has_login_err()` lockout — an unauthenticated attacker can brute-force the ~10^6-candidate seed space to reconstruct an active passwordless login token and authenticate as any targeted user, including administrators, without a password. Exploitation requires that a valid, unexpired passwordless login link (active for up to 7 days) exists for the target account at the time of the attack, and that the numeric link ID is known or guessable from the auto-increment primary key.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/08/2026
The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress presents a critical authentication bypass vulnerability stemming from insufficient randomness in its token generation mechanism. This flaw affects all versions up to and including 4.3 and fundamentally compromises the security of passwordless login functionality. The vulnerability resides in how the plugin generates magic-link tokens through the `dologin\s::rrand()` function, which employs a Mersenne Twister pseudo-random number generator seeded with only the fractional component of microtime() multiplied by one million. This approach effectively reduces the seed space to approximately 10^6 possible values, providing roughly 20 bits of entropy rather than the expected cryptographic strength. The constrained seed space makes the entire token generation process deterministic and predictable.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability creates a cascading security failure that enables attackers to bypass authentication entirely. When `Pswdless::try_login()` executes on the unauthenticated init hook, it processes login requests without proper authentication checks or rate limiting mechanisms. The function extracts target account information from the numeric ID embedded within the dologin parameter and performs hash comparison using a non-constant-time operator, which introduces additional attack surface. Furthermore, the plugin directly calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` without invoking standard WordPress authentication flows, bypassing built-in security measures such as lockout mechanisms that would normally be triggered by `Auth::_has_login_err()`. This design flaw means that even if an attacker were to guess a valid token, they could authenticate as any targeted user without triggering account lockouts or other protective measures.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and far-reaching for WordPress installations using the affected plugin. An unauthenticated attacker with knowledge of a valid passwordless login link for a target account can brute-force the limited seed space to reconstruct active tokens. This capability extends to all user accounts including administrators, effectively allowing privilege escalation without requiring knowledge of passwords or other credentials. The attack requires only that a valid, unexpired passwordless login link exists for the target account and that the numeric link ID is either known or guessable from the auto-increment primary key structure. Given that many systems expose such information through predictable ID patterns, this vulnerability becomes particularly dangerous in environments where user enumeration attacks are possible.
The vulnerability aligns with CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values and CWE-287 Improper Authentication, while also mapping to ATT&CK techniques including T1110.003 Credential Stuffing and T1566 Phishing. The root cause demonstrates poor cryptographic practices in entropy generation where a pseudo-random number generator is seeded with insufficient randomness, creating predictable outputs. This weakness allows attackers to perform offline brute-force attacks against the constrained seed space rather than requiring online guessing attempts, making exploitation both faster and more reliable. Organizations should immediately update to patched versions of the plugin or implement network-level mitigations such as rate limiting for authentication endpoints. Additionally, administrators should review and invalidate existing passwordless login tokens in affected installations and consider implementing additional security controls around account recovery mechanisms to prevent similar vulnerabilities from being exploited through other vectors.