CVE-2026-17494 in Power Systems Firmware
Summary
by MITRE • 08/19/2026
IBM Power Systems Firmware FW1120.00, and FW1110.00 through FW1110.30 is affected by a vulnerability in the interface between the BMC and the host system. An attacker with service access to the BMC can send a specially crafted command, allowing arbitrary code to be executed on the host system, giving full control over the host system and all hosted partitions, resulting in a confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/19/2026
The vulnerability identified within IBM Power Systems Firmware versions FW1120.00 and FW1110.00 through FW1110.30 represents a critical security flaw located at the interface between the Baseboard Management Controller BMC and the host system processor. This architectural component is responsible for out-of-band management tasks, including hardware monitoring, remote console access, and firmware updates. The specific defect arises from insufficient validation of commands received by the BMC before they are relayed to or executed on the host operating environment. Because this interface operates with high privileges to facilitate low-level system control, a failure in input sanitization allows an attacker who has already obtained service access credentials for the BMC to inject malicious payloads directly into the command stream targeting the host processor.
From a technical perspective, this flaw enables arbitrary code execution on the underlying host system. The mechanism likely involves exploiting a buffer overflow or logic error within the firmware routines that parse management commands. By sending specially crafted data structures over the IPMI or similar BMC communication protocols, an authenticated attacker can bypass standard security checks and execute instructions with kernel-level privileges on the host. This effectively breaks the isolation boundary between the management plane and the compute plane, allowing the attacker to take full control of the physical server hardware. The impact extends beyond a single operating system instance, as Power Systems typically run multiple logical partitions or virtual machines concurrently; therefore, compromising the host grants the adversary potential access to all hosted partitions running on that chassis.
The operational implications of this vulnerability are severe due to its direct impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. With full control over the host system, an attacker can exfiltrate sensitive data from memory disks or network traffic passing through the server, leading to significant data breaches. Integrity is compromised as the attacker can modify firmware settings alter configurations, or install persistent backdoors that survive reboots and standard security scans. Availability is threatened because the attacker could crash the host system halt all running partitions, or deploy ransomware-like behavior that encrypts critical storage volumes. This level of access effectively neutralizes most traditional endpoint protection mechanisms since the attacker operates at a privilege level equal to or higher than many security agents installed on the guest operating systems.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, often referred to as command injection, and potentially CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information if data exfiltration is performed during exploitation. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this scenario maps directly to T1546 Event Triggered Execution where malicious commands are executed via system triggers or management interfaces, and specifically relates to T1078 Valid Accounts as it requires initial service access credentials for the BMC. It also touches upon T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion if used to disable security monitoring tools on the host prior to further lateral movement. The attack path emphasizes the risk of privilege escalation from a managed subsystem to the primary compute environment, highlighting the dangers of trusting management interfaces without rigorous input validation and least-privilege enforcement.
Mitigation strategies must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural hardening. IBM has released firmware updates that address this specific flaw by implementing stricter command parsing logic and enhancing boundary checks between the BMC and host processors. Organizations running affected versions should immediately apply these patches to restore security boundaries. In addition to patching, administrators should enforce strict access controls on BMC interfaces, ensuring that only authorized personnel with strong multi-factor authentication can log in via IPMI or web-based management tools. Network segmentation is also critical; BMC networks should be isolated from general corporate LANs and the internet using firewalls and VLANs to prevent unauthorized network-level probing or credential stuffing attacks against the management interface. Regular auditing of BMC logs for unusual command sequences can help detect attempted exploitation activities before they result in full system compromise.