CVE-2026-18754 in GV-AS1620
Summary
by MITRE • 08/04/2026
The product firmware contains an embedded, static RSA private key utilized by the Lighttpd web server for TLS termination. Exposure of this private key allows malicious actors to breach the confidentiality and integrity of HTTPS communications, enabling traffic decryption and server spoofing.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/04/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical security flaw in embedded firmware where a static RSA private key is hardcoded within the Lighttpd web server configuration. The presence of such embedded credentials creates an inherent risk that extends beyond typical software vulnerabilities into the realm of cryptographic key management failures. When firmware contains static private keys, it fundamentally violates the principle of key rotation and secure credential handling that modern security practices demand. The exposure of this specific private key enables attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks against HTTPS communications, undermining the core security guarantees that Transport Layer Security provides.
The technical implementation flaw stems from the improper storage and management of cryptographic materials within the device firmware itself. This approach directly correlates with CWE-310 - Cryptographic Issues, specifically addressing the weakness of using static keys in embedded systems. The vulnerability allows for certificate forgery and traffic decryption because the private key can be extracted from the firmware through reverse engineering or direct memory access. Attackers leveraging this information can establish fake SSL/TLS certificates that appear legitimate to clients, enabling them to intercept and modify encrypted communications between users and the affected servers.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple data theft, as it compromises the fundamental trust model that HTTPS establishes between clients and servers. When adversaries gain access to the private key, they can impersonate the legitimate server and decrypt previously captured traffic, potentially accessing sensitive user data, session tokens, and confidential communications. This threat landscape aligns with ATT&CK technique T1566 - Phishing for Information and T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, as attackers can use the compromised communications to gather intelligence or establish persistent access points. The vulnerability affects not only individual user privacy but also organizational security posture by potentially enabling broader reconnaissance activities.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements in firmware design. Organizations should implement dynamic key generation and secure storage mechanisms that prevent static keys from being embedded within firmware images, aligning with NIST SP 800-57 recommendations for cryptographic key management. The implementation of hardware security modules or secure enclaves for key storage can provide the necessary isolation to protect against extraction attempts. Additionally, regular firmware updates and patch management procedures should be established to address potential key compromise scenarios, while network monitoring systems should be deployed to detect suspicious certificate issuance patterns that might indicate successful exploitation attempts.