CVE-2026-19274 in Observability with Instana
Summary
by MITRE • 09/04/2026
IBM Observability with Instana (Agent) Build 1.0.303 through 1.0.323 IBM Instana Agent Operator could allow an authenticated Kubernetes tenant to hijack or permanently destroy another tenant's cluster-level RBAC permissions, caused by cluster-scoped RBAC objects being keyed solely by the bare CR name with no namespace disambiguation, allowing a same-named `InstanaAgent` CR in an attacker-controlled namespace to silently overwrite the shared `ClusterRoleBinding` or delete it outright and revoke the victim agent's cluster monitoring access.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/04/2026
The vulnerability identified within IBM Observability with Instana Agent versions 1.0.303 through 1.0.323 represents a critical flaw in the Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control implementation, specifically affecting the Instana Agent Operator. This issue stems from an insecure design pattern where cluster-scoped resources are managed using identifiers that lack proper namespace isolation. In multi-tenant Kubernetes environments, it is imperative that operators handling cluster-wide permissions strictly adhere to naming conventions or resource scoping mechanisms that prevent cross-namespace interference. However, in this specific implementation, the operator keys its cluster-level Role-Based Access Control objects solely by the bare Custom Resource name without incorporating any namespace disambiguation logic. This architectural oversight creates a direct path for privilege escalation and denial of service attacks among tenants sharing the same cluster infrastructure.
From a technical perspective, the core flaw lies in how the Instana Agent Operator maps Kubernetes Custom Resources to ClusterRoleBindings. When an administrator deploys an InstanaAgent custom resource, the operator generates or updates associated RBAC objects at the cluster scope level. Because these operations rely exclusively on the name of the CR rather than a unique identifier that includes the namespace, any two tenants deploying resources with identical names will trigger conflicting state changes in the shared ClusterRoleBinding. An attacker operating within their own controlled namespace can deliberately create an InstanaAgent resource with the same name as a victim tenant's active agent configuration. Upon creation or update, the operator processes this request and overwrites the existing ClusterRoleBinding associated with that name. This action effectively severs the connection between the legitimate tenant’s monitoring agents and the necessary cluster permissions required for data collection and system visibility.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, encompassing both unauthorized access control manipulation and service disruption. An authenticated attacker can hijack the RBAC permissions intended for a victim tenant by overwriting the ClusterRoleBinding with their own configuration or deleting it entirely. This results in the permanent destruction of the victim’s cluster-level monitoring capabilities, leading to a complete loss of observability for critical infrastructure components. Beyond the denial of service aspect, if the attacker configures the hijacked binding to grant excessive privileges to their own agents, they could potentially escalate their access further within the cluster, although the primary documented risk is the revocation of legitimate agent permissions. This scenario highlights significant risks in shared Kubernetes clusters where strict namespace isolation policies are not enforced at the application logic level by operators managing global resources.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-732 Operator Error, as it involves a failure to enforce proper authorization boundaries between different security contexts within the same cluster environment. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for Kubernetes, this behavior corresponds to T1098.005 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, where an attacker modifies role bindings to gain or disrupt access. It also touches upon T1496 Resource Hijacking, as the attacker can effectively hijack the operational state of another tenant’s resources by exploiting shared naming conventions. The lack of namespace-awareness in cluster-scoped resource management is a common pitfall that undermines the fundamental security model of multi-tenant Kubernetes deployments.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must immediately upgrade to patched versions of IBM Observability with Instana Agent beyond build 1.0.323 where these RBAC handling mechanisms have been corrected to include namespace-specific identifiers or unique naming strategies for cluster-scoped objects. In the interim, administrators should enforce strict network policies and admission controllers that prevent cross-namespace resource name collisions if possible, although this is often difficult with cluster-level resources. Additionally, implementing rigorous audit logging of ClusterRoleBinding modifications can help detect such hijacking attempts in real-time. It is also recommended to review RBAC configurations regularly to ensure no unauthorized bindings exist and to consider using separate Kubernetes clusters for distinct tenant groups where feasible, thereby eliminating the shared state dependency that enables this attack vector.