CVE-2026-23944 in arcane
Summary
by MITRE • 01/20/2026
Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to version 1.13.2, unauthenticated requests could be proxied to remote environment agents, allowing access to remote environment resources without authentication. The environment proxy middleware handled `/api/environments/{id}/...` requests for remote environments before authentication was enforced. When the environment ID was not local, the middleware proxied the request and attached the manager-held agent token, even if the caller was unauthenticated. This enabled unauthenticated access to remote environment operations (e.g., listing containers, streaming logs, or other agent endpoints). An unauthenticated attacker could access and manipulate remote environment resources via the proxy, potentially leading to data exposure, unauthorized changes, or service disruption. Version 1.13.2 patches the vulnerability.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/03/2026
The vulnerability described in CVE-2026-23944 represents a critical authentication bypass flaw within Arcane, a Docker management interface that provides centralized control over containerized environments. This issue affects versions prior to 1.13.2 and demonstrates a fundamental failure in the application's security architecture where authentication checks are improperly enforced at the proxy layer. The vulnerability specifically targets the environment proxy middleware component that handles requests directed to remote environment agents through the API endpoint pattern `/api/environments/{id}/...`. The flaw occurs when the system processes requests for non-local environment identifiers, creating a pathway for unauthorized access that bypasses the normal authentication flow.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the middleware's improper handling of environment ID validation and authentication enforcement. When an incoming request contains a remote environment identifier, the system automatically proxies the request to the corresponding environment agent without first verifying the caller's authentication status. This design flaw allows any unauthenticated user to leverage the manager-held agent token that is automatically attached to proxied requests, effectively granting access to operations that should require proper authentication. The vulnerability enables attackers to perform various remote operations including listing containers, streaming logs, and accessing other agent endpoints, all without providing valid credentials. This represents a classic case of insecure direct object reference where the system fails to validate that the requester has proper authorization to access the target environment resources.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access to encompass potential data exposure, unauthorized modifications, and service disruption within the Docker container management ecosystem. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to gain visibility into running containers, access sensitive application logs, or potentially manipulate container operations on remote environments. The implications are particularly severe in multi-tenant or shared infrastructure scenarios where unauthorized access to one environment could potentially compromise adjacent or related systems. This vulnerability directly maps to CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) and CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery) categories, representing a failure in authorization controls and potentially enabling privilege escalation through unauthorized proxy requests. The attack pattern aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078.004 (Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts) and T1566.002 (Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment) as attackers could potentially leverage this vulnerability to establish persistent access to remote environments after initial compromise.
The remediation for this vulnerability involves implementing proper authentication checks before any proxy operations are executed, ensuring that the manager-held agent token is only attached to requests from authenticated users. Version 1.13.2 of Arcane addresses this issue by enforcing authentication checks at the proxy middleware level, preventing the automatic attachment of agent tokens to unauthenticated requests. Organizations should immediately upgrade to this patched version and implement additional monitoring to detect potential exploitation attempts. Security teams should also consider implementing network segmentation and access controls around the Arcane interface to limit the blast radius of potential exploitation. The vulnerability highlights the importance of proper authorization enforcement in distributed systems and the critical need for security controls to be applied consistently across all layers of an application's architecture, particularly in proxy and middleware components that handle cross-system communication.