CVE-2026-32823 in dataCycle-CORE
Summary
by MITRE • 07/20/2026
dataCycle is a data management system for centrally storing, managing, searching, finding, and distributing data. In dataCycle-CORE, the module handling core processing and framework rules, before and including version 25.07.3, the application exposes server-side state changes through `GET` routes. Because browsers automatically send cookies on same-site top-level navigation and Rails does not apply CSRF protections to `GET`, an attacker can force a logged-in victim to modify application state by embedding a link, image, iframe, or redirect to one of these endpoints. This was confirmed on the target with a normal `Standard` account: a cross-site-style `GET` to `watch_lists/:id/add_item?thing_id=...` inserted content into a watch list with no CSRF token. Additional `GET` mutation routes exist in the codebase, including user impersonation for authorized admins and cache or translation state changes. This is patched in version 26.06.08.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/20/2026
The dataCycle-CORE system presents a critical server-side request forgery vulnerability that exploits fundamental web security principles through improper handling of state-changing operations. This vulnerability exists within the core processing module of the application and affects versions up to 25.07.3, representing a significant risk to user data integrity and system confidentiality. The flaw stems from the application's design decision to expose server-side state modification capabilities through GET requests, which violates established security practices for operations that alter application state.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability leverages the inherent behavior of web browsers that automatically include cookies in all requests to the same origin, combined with Rails' default handling of CSRF protection mechanisms. Specifically, Rails does not apply CSRF protections to GET requests by default, creating an exploitable gap where malicious actors can construct URLs that trigger state modifications without requiring user interaction beyond visiting a malicious page. This is particularly dangerous because the application's watch list functionality allows for content insertion through simple GET requests such as `watch_lists/:id/add_item?thing_id=...` which requires no CSRF token validation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data manipulation to potentially enable unauthorized access and data exfiltration. Attackers can leverage this weakness to inject malicious content into user watch lists, potentially compromising the integrity of user data repositories and enabling further attacks such as cross-site scripting or session hijacking through manipulated data structures. The presence of additional GET mutation routes including user impersonation capabilities for authorized administrators and cache/translation state changes creates multiple attack vectors that could be combined to escalate privileges or access restricted functionality.
The vulnerability aligns with CWE-352, which specifically addresses Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in web applications. This classification indicates the fundamental flaw in the application's security architecture where it fails to implement proper anti-CSRF measures for state-changing operations. The attack pattern follows typical CSRF exploitation techniques described in MITRE ATT&CK framework under T1566, specifically targeting the use of malicious links or embedded content to manipulate web applications. The vulnerability also demonstrates poor input validation and insufficient authorization checks as outlined in various web application security standards.
Organizations utilizing dataCycle-CORE must implement immediate mitigations including upgrading to version 26.06.08 which resolves this issue, while also implementing proper CSRF protection mechanisms for all state-changing operations regardless of HTTP method. Additional defensive measures should include enforcing CSRF tokens for all non-idempotent operations, implementing proper CORS policies, and conducting thorough code reviews to identify other potential GET-based mutation endpoints. The fix addresses the root cause by ensuring that all state-modifying operations require appropriate authentication tokens, thereby preventing unauthorized modifications through automated browser requests.