CVE-2026-38924 in Serenainfo

Summary

by MITRE • 09/14/2026

In Oraios AI Serena before 1.0.0, the listen address of the MCP server in HTTP mode is 0.0.0.0. NOTE: the Supplier observed that 0.0.0.0 was a "potential security hazard" but the Serena documentation, at the time of the issue report proposing 127.0.0.1 instead of 0.0.0.0, recommended "use a sandboxed environment for running Serena."

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 09/14/2026

The vulnerability in Oraios AI Serena prior to version 1.0.0 involves the default configuration of the Model Context Protocol server operating in HTTP mode. Specifically, the service binds its listen address to 0.0.0.0 rather than a loopback interface such as 127.0.0.1 or localhost. This binding strategy causes the application to accept network connections on all available IPv4 interfaces of the host machine. In standard networking configurations, this means that any client capable of reaching the server's IP address over the network can establish a connection and interact with the MCP server endpoints. While binding to 0.0.0.0 is not inherently malicious in environments where strict firewall rules or physical isolation prevent external access, it represents a significant security misconfiguration when deployed in contexts where the host might be exposed to untrusted networks or lacks sufficient perimeter defenses.

The core technical flaw lies in the failure to restrict service exposure to local-only traffic by default. By listening on all interfaces, the application increases its attack surface unnecessarily. An attacker who gains network access to the subnet containing the Serena server can potentially interact with the AI model and associated context tools without authentication or through weakly protected endpoints if such controls are not implemented at a higher layer. This configuration contradicts the principle of least privilege regarding network exposure, as it assumes that external security measures will adequately mitigate risks rather than relying on application-level restrictions to limit access scope. The supplier acknowledged this behavior as a potential security hazard but initially recommended running Serena in a sandboxed environment instead of changing the default bind address.

From an operational impact perspective, this misconfiguration can lead to unauthorized data exposure or manipulation if the MCP server exposes sensitive tools or model capabilities to external entities. Attackers could potentially exploit exposed endpoints to perform prompt injection attacks, extract training data through inference queries, or abuse computational resources for malicious purposes such as cryptomining or denial of service. The risk is exacerbated in cloud environments where instances are often assigned public IP addresses by default, making the server immediately accessible from the internet unless network security groups explicitly block inbound traffic on the relevant ports. This scenario aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-771 Missing Reference to Active Allocated Resource, as the service fails to properly restrict access based on its intended operational context.

Mitigation strategies should prioritize restricting the listen address to 127.0.0.1 or localhost unless external network access is explicitly required and secured through additional controls such as TLS encryption, mutual authentication, and reverse proxy configurations with strict IP whitelisting. If binding to all interfaces is necessary for specific use cases, administrators must ensure that robust firewall rules are in place to limit source IPs to trusted ranges only. Furthermore, organizations should adopt a defense-in-depth approach by implementing network segmentation and monitoring traffic patterns for anomalies indicative of exploitation attempts. This vulnerability also relates to ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts if authentication is bypassed via open access, or T1595 Active Scanning if attackers probe the exposed ports to identify vulnerable services. Updating to version 1.0.0 or later where this default may have been corrected, or manually configuring the bind address post-deployment, are essential steps for remediation.

Responsible

MITRE

Reservation

04/06/2026

Disclosure

09/14/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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