CVE-2026-54628 in anyquery
Summary
by MITRE • 09/14/2026
Anyquery is an SQL query engine built on top of SQLite. Prior to 0.4.5, anyquery server exposes URL-capable SQLite virtual table modules such as json_reader and log_reader through its unauthenticated MySQL-compatible server port without restricting outbound destinations. A remote attacker can provide a loopback, private-network, or link-local cloud metadata URL, causing go-getter in the Anyquery server process to fetch the selected resource and expose its response as queryable table data. This permits internal network probing, access to internal APIs, and disclosure of cloud credentials; low-integrity impact is possible when a reached internal API performs state-changing actions. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.5.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/14/2026
The vulnerability identified involves the Anyquery SQL query engine, which operates as an SQLite-based system with a MySQL-compatible server interface. Prior to version 0.4.5, this software contained a critical security flaw related to how it handled URL-capable virtual table modules such as json_reader and log_reader. These modules are designed to allow users to query external resources via SQL-like syntax, effectively treating remote data sources as local database tables. However, the implementation failed to enforce strict restrictions on outbound network destinations when these queries were executed through the unauthenticated MySQL-compatible port. This architectural oversight allowed any client connecting to the server without authentication to specify arbitrary URLs for resource retrieval.
A remote attacker can exploit this flaw by crafting specific SQL queries that reference loopback addresses, private-network IP ranges, or link-local cloud metadata endpoints. When such a query is processed, the underlying Go-getter library within the Anyquery server process initiates an outbound HTTP request to the specified destination. The content retrieved from these internal resources is then exposed back to the attacker as queryable table data through the MySQL protocol interface. This mechanism effectively turns the vulnerable service into a blind or semi-blind server-side request forgery vector, enabling the attacker to interact with services that are not directly accessible from the public internet but are reachable by the Anyquery host machine.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant and multifaceted. It facilitates internal network probing, allowing an attacker to map out the topology of the local network by testing connectivity to various IP addresses and ports. More critically, it enables unauthorized access to sensitive cloud metadata services, such as those provided by AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service or Azure Managed Identity endpoints. By fetching data from these sources, attackers can retrieve temporary security credentials, IAM roles, and other configuration details that are typically protected from external access. This disclosure of cloud credentials poses a severe risk, potentially leading to full compromise of the associated cloud infrastructure if those credentials have elevated privileges.
Furthermore, the vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure. If an attacker targets internal APIs that perform state-changing actions, such as modifying configurations or triggering workflows, low-integrity impact is possible. This means the attack can be leveraged for server-side request forgery to manipulate backend systems, although the primary and most immediate risk remains the exfiltration of sensitive data from internal services. The lack of authentication on the MySQL-compatible port exacerbates this issue, as no prior authorization is required to initiate these malicious queries.
This flaw aligns with CWE-918, which describes Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), specifically where the server makes requests to unintended destinations due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this behavior corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1557, Adversary-in-the-Middle or Lateral Tool Transfer via internal services, and more broadly falls under reconnaissance activities like T1046, Network Service Discovery. The exploitation relies on the server acting as a proxy for network requests, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses that do not inspect outbound traffic from application servers in this manner.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must immediately upgrade Anyquery to version 0.4.5 or later, where these restrictions have been implemented. In addition to upgrading, it is advisable to enforce authentication on the MySQL-compatible port to prevent unauthenticated access entirely. Network-level controls should also be reviewed; implementing egress filtering rules that restrict outbound connections from the host running Anyquery can provide a defense-in-depth layer against SSRF attacks. This includes blocking access to known cloud metadata IP ranges and limiting outbound traffic to only necessary external domains, thereby reducing the attack surface even if similar vulnerabilities are discovered in future versions of the software.