CVE-2026-86701 in ManabiPocket for Parents
Summary
by MITRE • 09/15/2026
Android application "ManabiPocket for Parents" contains an improper access control vulnerability in one of its components. A malicious application installed on the user's Android device may exploit the affected component via an Intent, potentially allowing the malicious application to obtain sensitive information from the affected application.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/15/2026
The security flaw identified within the ManabiPocket for Parents Android application constitutes a critical failure in access control mechanisms, specifically manifesting as improper privilege management or insecure direct object references depending on the specific implementation details of the exposed component. This vulnerability arises when an internal activity or service is exported without adequate protection against unauthorized invocation by other applications installed on the same device. In the Android ecosystem, components such as activities and services can be configured to accept intents from external sources if they are marked with android:exported=true in the application manifest. When developers fail to implement robust verification logic within these exposed entry points, any third-party application gains the ability to interact directly with the vulnerable component's functionality. This architectural oversight bypasses the intended isolation boundaries that Android’s permission model is designed to enforce between distinct applications, effectively creating a bridge for data exfiltration and unauthorized state manipulation.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability allows malicious actors to exploit the trust relationship inherent in local inter-process communication on mobile devices. By crafting specific intents with precise action strings and potentially required extras or parameters, a malicious application can trigger actions within ManabiPocket for Parents that were not intended for public consumption. The primary consequence of this exploitation is the potential disclosure of sensitive information stored locally by the parent application. Depending on how data is passed via intent extras or retrieved through exposed methods during the invocation process, an attacker could extract personal identifiable information, authentication tokens, session cookies, or other confidential user data. This breach compromises the confidentiality integrity of the system and undermines the privacy expectations of users who rely on the application to manage sensitive family-related content securely.
This type of vulnerability is formally categorized under CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management when it involves bypassing access controls for elevated functions, or more commonly in this context as CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write if memory corruption occurs during intent parsing, though the description points strongly toward CWE-501 Trust Boundary Violation. The exploitation technique aligns with MITRE ATT&CK Mobile Attack Pattern T1213 Data from Information Repositories, where adversaries extract data directly from local storage or application components rather than through network-based exfiltration initially. It also relates to the broader category of Insecure Direct Object References if specific user identifiers are passed via intent and used without validation to retrieve private records. The lack of signature-level permission checks or explicit allow-listing of calling packages leaves the application vulnerable to any app on the device, regardless of its stated permissions in its own manifest.
Mitigation strategies must focus on hardening the Android component configuration and implementing strict input validation. Developers should immediately review all activities and services within the ManabiPocket for Parents codebase to identify those marked as exported. Any internal components that do not require interaction from external applications should be set to android:exported=false in the AndroidManifest.xml file, thereby restricting access exclusively to other components within the same application package. For any component that must remain accessible externally due to legitimate functionality requirements, it is imperative to implement rigorous verification logic at runtime. This includes checking the calling package name against a whitelist of trusted applications using PackageManager.getPackageInfo or similar APIs before processing incoming intents. Additionally, developers should enforce signature-level permissions by defining custom manifest permissions and requiring them in both the exporting application's manifest and the importing application's configuration, ensuring that only apps signed with matching certificates can invoke sensitive operations. Regular static analysis scanning for exported components without proper protection is also recommended to prevent regression of this security posture.