CVE-2026-44544 in gittuf
Summary
by MITRE • 05/14/2026
gittuf is a platform-agnostic Git security system. Prior to 0.14.0, an attacker with push access to gittuf's Reference State Log (RSL) can roll back the current policy to any previous policy trusted by the current set of root keys. gittuf determines the policy to load by inspecting the RSL. Except for the very first policy (which is automatically trusted given gittuf's TOFU model, or verified against manually specified keys), whenever an RSL entry that points to a new policy is encountered, gittuf validates that this policy is trusted. This is done by checking that the new policy’s root metadata is signed by the required threshold of the current policy's root keys. Because of this, an attacker with push access to the RSL may create a new entry that references an old policy (that is trusted by the most recent policy's set of root keys), thereby rolling back gittuf's policy to the attacker's chosen state. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/31/2026
The vulnerability in gittuf versions prior to 0140 represents a critical security flaw in the platform-agnostic Git security system's reference state log validation mechanism. This weakness stems from the system's trust model where the current policy is determined by inspecting the reference state log, which contains entries pointing to policy metadata. The system operates under a trust-on-first-use model for the initial policy, but subsequent policy validation relies on checking that new policy root metadata is signed by the required threshold of current root keys. An attacker with push access to the reference state log can exploit this by creating malicious entries that reference previously trusted older policies, effectively rolling back the system to a state controlled by the attacker.
This vulnerability fundamentally compromises the integrity and authenticity of the policy enforcement mechanism within gittuf's security architecture. The flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the policy state without requiring access to the actual policy files or root keys, as long as they can modify the reference state log. The system's design assumes that all entries in the reference state log are legitimate and that the validation process correctly identifies trusted policies, but this assumption fails when an attacker can inject entries pointing to older, previously trusted policies. This creates a rollback attack vector that undermines the security guarantees provided by the system's policy management framework.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple policy rollback, as it enables attackers to potentially bypass security controls that were previously enforced by newer policy versions. An attacker could roll back to a policy that has weaker security requirements, potentially allowing unauthorized changes to Git repositories or disabling security checks that would normally prevent malicious activity. This type of attack aligns with the attacker pattern described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the "Defense Evasion" tactic, specifically targeting the "Modify System Image" sub-technique where adversaries manipulate system components to evade detection or enforcement mechanisms.
The vulnerability is classified as a weakness in the reference state log validation process, corresponding to CWE-284 Access Control Bypass, where the system fails to properly validate that all referenced policies are legitimate and current. The root cause lies in the lack of proper validation of the reference state log entries themselves, allowing an attacker to manipulate the policy loading process through the reference state log. This represents a failure in the principle of least privilege and proper access control enforcement within the gittuf system. The fix implemented in version 0.14.0 addresses this by strengthening the validation mechanisms to ensure that reference state log entries cannot be manipulated to roll back to previously trusted but now potentially compromised policy states. The mitigation involves implementing stricter checks on reference state log modifications and ensuring that policy rollback operations are properly authenticated and authorized, preventing unauthorized modifications to the policy enforcement state.