CVE-2026-45139 in CI4MS
Summary
by MITRE • 07/20/2026
CI4MS is a CodeIgniter 4-based content management system skeleton. Prior to version 0.31.9.0, the Fileeditor module enforces an extension allowlist (`['css','js','html','txt','json','sql','md']`) on content-write operations (`saveFile`, `createFile`), but two destructive endpoints — `deleteFileOrFolder` and `renameFile` — never validate the extension of the *source* path. A backend user with file-editor permissions can therefore unlink or rename any file inside the project root that is not explicitly listed in the small `$hiddenItems` blocklist. Critical framework files such as `app/Config/Routes.php`, `app/Config/App.php`, `app/Config/Database.php`, `app/Config/Filters.php`, `public/index.php`, and `public/.htaccess` all live outside that blocklist and can be destroyed, producing a persistent denial of service that requires filesystem-level redeployment to recover. Version 0.31.9.0 patches the issue.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/20/2026
The vulnerability exists within CI4MS, a CodeIgniter 4-based content management system skeleton, where the Fileeditor module implements an extension allowlist mechanism for file write operations but fails to validate source paths during destructive operations. This security flaw affects versions prior to 0.31.9.0 and stems from inconsistent input validation practices within the file management endpoints. The system correctly validates file extensions when creating or saving files through `saveFile` and `createFile` methods, enforcing a restrictive allowlist containing only specific extensions including css, js, html, txt, json, sql, and md. However, the `deleteFileOrFolder` and `renameFile` endpoints bypass this validation mechanism entirely by not checking the extension of the source path before executing destructive operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and persistent, as it allows authenticated backend users with file-editor permissions to target critical system files throughout the project root directory. The absence of proper source path validation means attackers can manipulate any file that does not fall within the limited `$hiddenItems` blocklist, which typically contains only a small subset of sensitive paths. This oversight enables attackers to target fundamental framework configuration files such as `app/Config/Routes.php`, `app/Config/App.php`, `app/Config/Database.php`, `app/Config/Filters.php`, `public/index.php`, and `public/.htaccess` that are essential for system operation. When these critical files are deleted or renamed, the consequences extend beyond simple data loss to include complete system denial of service, requiring full filesystem-level redeployment for recovery.
The vulnerability aligns with CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) and CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) categories, representing a path traversal and privilege escalation issue that undermines the principle of least privilege. From an attack perspective, this flaw maps directly to ATT&CK technique T1486 (Data Encrypted for Ransom) and T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) as it enables attackers to disrupt system functionality through file manipulation. The vulnerability demonstrates a classic case of incomplete input validation where the system validates output operations but neglects to validate the source parameters in destructive operations, creating an attack surface that allows arbitrary file modification or deletion.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing consistent extension validation across all file operations including destructive endpoints, ensuring that source paths are validated against the same allowlist restrictions applied to write operations. The fix implemented in version 0.31.9.0 addresses this by extending the validation logic to include source path checks in both `deleteFileOrFolder` and `renameFile` methods. Organizations should also consider implementing additional security controls such as file access logging, mandatory file backup procedures, and regular security audits of file management operations. The patch demonstrates proper defensive programming practices by ensuring that all paths are validated regardless of operation type, thereby preventing attackers from exploiting the discrepancy between different validation mechanisms within the same module.