CVE-2026-47570 in GeForce
Summary
by MITRE • 09/30/2026
NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows contains a vulnerability in the CUDA driver where an attacker could cause a library to be loaded from an uncontrolled search path. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, data tampering, and denial of service.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/30/2026
The NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows contains a critical security flaw within its CUDA driver component that stems from improper handling of dynamic library loading mechanisms. This vulnerability is classified as an insecure search path for libraries, which corresponds to CWE-427 in the Common Weakness Enumeration standard. The core technical issue arises when the application or system attempts to load shared object files or DLLs without specifying absolute paths, thereby relying on a sequence of directories defined by environment variables such as PATH or LD_LIBRARY_PATH. If an attacker can manipulate these search paths prior to the execution of vulnerable CUDA operations, they can place maliciously crafted libraries in one of the earlier directories within that path. When the NVIDIA driver subsequently attempts to load its required dependencies, it will inadvertently load the attacker-controlled library instead of the legitimate system file.
This mechanism allows for a sophisticated attack vector where an adversary does not need direct access to the application binaries themselves but only needs control over the execution environment or the ability to inject files into accessible directories on the target machine. The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted. Upon successful exploitation, an attacker can achieve arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the process running the CUDA driver. This often translates directly to privilege escalation if the vulnerable service runs under a high-privilege account such as SYSTEM or Administrator. Furthermore, because GPU drivers operate at a low level within the operating system kernel space in many configurations, compromising them can lead to full system compromise, allowing for extensive information disclosure of sensitive data stored on the host machine.
The consequences extend beyond simple code execution to include significant integrity violations and availability issues. Data tampering becomes possible as the attacker gains write access to memory regions controlled by the driver, potentially altering computational results in scientific or financial applications that rely on GPU acceleration. Additionally, denial of service conditions can be induced if the malicious library causes crashes or hangs within the graphics subsystem, effectively rendering the system unusable for tasks requiring hardware-accelerated computing. From a threat intelligence perspective, this type of vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to DLL side-loading and process injection, which are commonly used by advanced persistent threats to establish persistence and evade detection mechanisms that focus solely on executable files rather than dynamic link libraries.
Mitigation strategies must address both the immediate technical flaw and broader operational security practices. The primary remediation is for NVIDIA to release a patched version of the GPU Display Driver that enforces strict path validation or uses absolute paths when loading internal dependencies, thereby eliminating the ambiguity in library resolution. Organizations should immediately apply these vendor-provided updates across all workstations and servers utilizing CUDA-enabled hardware. In addition to patching, administrators should enforce least-privilege principles by ensuring that standard user accounts do not have write access to system directories or environment variables that influence driver behavior. Security monitoring solutions should also be configured to detect unusual DLL load events originating from known NVIDIA processes, providing an additional layer of defense against exploitation attempts while patches are being deployed.