CVE-2026-92548 in WP Popular Posts Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/01/2026
The WP Popular Posts plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 7.4.2 via the 'context' parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract sensitive edit-context fields — including raw title, raw content body, password, meta, status, and guid — from non-public post objects such as wp_block synced patterns that WordPress core itself refuses to expose to unauthenticated callers. This is possible because the plugin's REST route is registered with a permission_callback of __return_true and passes the caller-supplied context parameter (e.g., context=edit) directly to WP_REST_Posts_Controller::prepare_item_for_response() without invoking get_item_permissions_check() or check_read_permission(), while the underlying query accepts an arbitrary post_type value without enforcing public or show_in_rest visibility flags.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/01/2026
The vulnerability identified in versions of the WP Popular Posts plugin up to and including 7.4.2 represents a critical failure in access control logic within WordPress REST API implementations. This flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass standard permission checks, resulting in the exposure of sensitive information that is typically restricted by WordPress core security mechanisms. The root cause lies in how the plugin registers its custom REST route, specifically through an improper configuration of the permission callback and a lack of validation on input parameters before they are passed to underlying controller methods.
The technical flaw stems from the registration of a REST endpoint with a permission_callback set to __return_true. This function always returns true, effectively disabling any authentication or authorization checks for requests hitting this specific route. Furthermore, the plugin accepts a context parameter supplied directly by the caller and passes it without validation to WP_REST_Posts_Controller::prepare_item_for_response(). In standard WordPress operations, accessing sensitive data requires invoking get_item_permissions_check() or check_read_permission(), which verify that the requester has appropriate privileges for the requested post type and status. By bypassing these checks, the plugin allows any user, including those who are not logged in, to request edit-context fields from posts that should be private or restricted.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant because it enables the extraction of sensitive metadata associated with non-public post objects. Specifically, attackers can retrieve raw titles, raw content bodies, passwords, meta data, status information, and globally unique identifiers (GUIDs) from wp_block synced patterns. WordPress core explicitly refuses to expose these fields to unauthenticated callers for security reasons, as they may contain confidential user data or internal system configurations. The vulnerability is exacerbated by the fact that the underlying query accepts an arbitrary post_type value without enforcing public visibility flags or show_in_rest restrictions. This means attackers can target specific types of content that are intended to be hidden from the general public, leading to a comprehensive disclosure of site internals and potentially user credentials stored in meta fields.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-200, which categorizes exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor, as well as CWE-862, representing missing authorization checks. From an offensive security perspective, this behavior is consistent with ATT&CK technique T1530, Data from Local System Exfiltration via Cloud or External Services, where attackers leverage API endpoints to harvest data that should be inaccessible. The lack of input validation on the post_type parameter also touches upon CWE-20, Improper Input Validation, as the system fails to restrict the scope of accessible resources based on their visibility settings.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability involve immediate updates to the WP Popular Posts plugin to a version where these permission checks are properly implemented. Administrators should ensure that REST endpoints do not use __return_true for permissions unless absolutely necessary and always verify user capabilities before processing requests. Developers must enforce strict validation of input parameters, ensuring that post_type values correspond only to public or explicitly allowed types. Additionally, implementing proper authorization callbacks that invoke standard WordPress permission functions will prevent unauthorized access to sensitive edit-context fields. Until the plugin is updated, limiting REST API exposure through server-side configurations or firewall rules can provide a temporary layer of defense against exploitation attempts targeting this specific endpoint.