CVE-2026-55393 in Aware2
Summary
by MITRE • 10/01/2026
Unvalidated pathnames in the web interface in Teledyne FLIR Aware2 versions through 6.9.0.2 (PackBot) and 1.7.9 (FirstLook) allows remote unauthenticated attackers to read configuration and security parameters on Teledyne FLIR PackBot and FirstLook robots running this software via path traversal.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/01/2026
The vulnerability identified in Teledyne FLIR Aware2 versions through 6.9.0.2 for the PackBot platform and version 1.7.9 for the FirstLook robot represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper input validation within the web-based management interface. This issue is classified as CWE-22, which denotes Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, commonly known as path traversal or directory traversal. The core technical failure lies in the application's handling of user-supplied file paths without adequate sanitization or boundary checks. When an attacker constructs a request containing maliciously crafted pathname sequences, such as dot-dot-slash characters followed by absolute system paths, the underlying web server interprets these inputs literally rather than restricting them to the intended document root. This lack of validation allows the application to resolve references outside its designated secure directory structure, effectively bypassing access controls that are typically enforced at the file system level for standard web requests.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability enables remote unauthenticated attackers to read sensitive configuration files and security parameters stored on the robot's operating system. Because no authentication is required to exploit this flaw, any individual with network connectivity to the device can initiate the attack without needing valid credentials or prior access privileges. The ability to extract configuration data exposes internal settings that may include IP addresses, port configurations, service endpoints, and potentially hardcoded secrets or API keys used for communication between the robot and its control station. In industrial and defense contexts where these robots are deployed, such information disclosure can facilitate further reconnaissance efforts, allowing adversaries to map out network topology and identify other potential attack vectors against connected systems or backend infrastructure.
The impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data leakage. By accessing security parameters, an attacker may gain insights into encryption keys, authentication mechanisms, or logging configurations that could be leveraged for more sophisticated attacks such as session hijacking, privilege escalation, or denial-of-service operations targeting specific services identified in the configuration files. For robotic systems operating in hazardous environments, compromising these settings could indirectly affect operational integrity if attackers manipulate parameters to disrupt normal functionality after gaining initial access through information disclosure. The absence of authentication requirements significantly lowers the barrier for exploitation, making this vulnerability highly attractive to automated scanning tools and opportunistic threat actors seeking quick wins against IoT and industrial control system devices.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching to versions that address these input validation flaws by enforcing strict allow-lists on file paths and ensuring all user inputs are normalized before processing. In the interim, network-level controls should be implemented to restrict access to the web interface exclusively from trusted management networks using firewalls or VLAN segmentation. Additionally, deploying Web Application Firewalls with rules specifically designed to detect path traversal patterns can provide a layer of defense against exploitation attempts. It is also recommended to disable unnecessary services and interfaces on the robots to reduce the attack surface, ensuring that only essential communication channels remain active and monitored for anomalous activity consistent with CWE-20 related injection attacks.