CVE-2026-48206 in Camel
Summary
by MITRE • 07/06/2026
Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel JIRA component.
The camel-jira producers read their operation parameters - the issue key, project key, transition id, summary, type, assignee, components, watchers, link type, work-log minutes and others - from Exchange message headers. The header constants defined in JiraConstants (for example ISSUE_KEY = IssueKey, ISSUE_PROJECT_KEY = ProjectKey, ISSUE_TRANSITION_ID = IssueTransitionId, LINK_TYPE = linkType) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a jira: producer, any HTTP client could therefore supply these headers and override the values the route intended, driving JIRA operations against the configured JIRA instance with the endpoint's configured service-account credentials - for example deleting or transitioning an arbitrary issue (via IssueKey / IssueTransitionId), creating an issue in a different project (via ProjectKey), modifying issue fields, adding or removing watchers, or logging work. The operations are bounded by what the configured service account is permitted to do. No credentials are required from the attacker when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that drive JIRA operations via the raw header names must use the CamelJira* names (for example CamelJiraIssueKey) instead of the old values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the camel-jira control headers from any untrusted ingress before the jira: producer (for example removing the IssueKey, ProjectKey, IssueTransitionId and related headers at the start of the route), and set the required JIRA operation parameters from a trusted source.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/06/2026
The vulnerability described represents a critical authorization bypass flaw in Apache Camel's JIRA component that stems from improper input validation and flawed header filtering mechanisms. This issue manifests when camel-jira producers consume operation parameters from Exchange message headers, specifically those defined in JiraConstants with non-prefixed names such as ISSUE_KEY, ISSUE_PROJECT_KEY, and ISSUE_TRANSITION_ID. The root cause lies in the HttpHeaderFilterStrategy implementation which only filters headers beginning with the Camel prefix, allowing user-controlled headers to bypass security boundaries and directly influence JIRA operations. This design flaw creates a pathway for unauthorized manipulation of JIRA issue management functions through HTTP requests that are processed by routes bridging HTTP consumers like platform-http into jira producers.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability enables attackers to manipulate critical JIRA operation parameters through specially crafted HTTP requests that include malicious header values. When an unauthenticated HTTP consumer bridges into a jira producer, any external client can supply headers containing arbitrary issue keys, project identifiers, transition IDs, and other operational parameters that override the intended route configuration. This allows for operations such as deleting arbitrary issues, transitioning issues to different states, creating new issues in unauthorized projects, modifying issue fields, managing watchers, and logging work hours using the configured service account credentials. The impact is bounded by the permissions of the service account configured for the JIRA endpoint, but this still represents a significant escalation of privileges within the system's authorization boundaries.
This vulnerability directly maps to CWE-20 Improper Input Validation and CWE-863 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, both of which are classified under the Software Security CPE 2.3 category. The attack vector aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts for maintaining persistence and T1566 Phishing for credential access, as it allows attackers to leverage legitimate service accounts without requiring additional authentication credentials. The flaw demonstrates a classic case of insufficient input sanitization combined with inadequate header filtering that permits user-controlled data to influence system operations at the boundary between HTTP ingress and internal message processing.
The operational impact extends beyond simple privilege escalation to encompass potential data integrity compromise and unauthorized system manipulation within JIRA environments. Organizations using affected Apache Camel versions face risk of unauthorized issue modifications, project infiltration, and operational disruption through automated attacks that can be executed without authentication. The vulnerability affects multiple release streams including 4.0.0 through 4.14.7, 4.15.0 through 4.18.2, and 4.19.0 through 4.20.9, requiring careful migration planning across different LTS and stable releases. The recommended remediation involves upgrading to version 4.21.0 or appropriate patch versions for each affected release stream, with specific guidance for maintaining backward compatibility by using Camel-prefixed header names such as CamelJiraIssueKey instead of the legacy non-prefixed variants.
Organizations unable to immediately upgrade should implement defensive measures including header stripping at route entry points to remove potentially malicious control headers before they reach the jira producer component. This mitigation strategy requires careful identification and removal of specific header names such as IssueKey, ProjectKey, IssueTransitionId, and related parameters from untrusted ingress sources. Additionally, operators must ensure that all JIRA operation parameters are sourced exclusively from trusted internal components rather than external HTTP requests, maintaining strict separation between user-facing interfaces and critical system operations. The fix addresses the fundamental security boundary issue by ensuring that only properly validated and filtered headers can influence JIRA operations, effectively closing the authorization bypass pathway through proper header namespace management and input validation controls.