CVE-2026-55522 in PraisonAI
Summary
by MITRE • 08/05/2026
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 3.9.26 through 4.6.57 of praiseonai and 0.12.12 through 1.6.57 of praiseonaiagents, the workflow "include" feature is vulnerable to code execution. Workflow._execute_include() implicitly imports and runs an included recipe's tools.py via a raw importlib.util.spec_from_file_location() and spec.loader.exec_module() call, without honoring the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS/PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS autoload opt-in gates or routing through the centralized safe loader that protects the other tools.py autoload paths. As a result, a workflow that includes an attacker-controlled local recipe directory executes arbitrary module-level Python code during include setup, before any child workflow parsing or model call, and the same sink is reachable through the higher-level praisonai.recipe.run() recipe API. An attacker who can cause a victim process to run a workflow or recipe that includes an untrusted local recipe achieves arbitrary Python code execution as the PraisonAI process user, a variant that bypasses the hardening applied to the previously disclosed automatic tools.py RCE advisory family. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.58 of praisonai and 1.6.58 of praisonaiagents.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/05/2026
The vulnerability described affects PraisonAI, a multi-agent teams system that enables automated workflow execution through recipe-based configurations. This security flaw exists within the workflow include functionality that allows users to incorporate external recipes into their main workflows. The issue spans versions 3.9.26 through 4.6.57 of praisonai and 0.12.12 through 1.6.57 of praisonaiagents, creating a significant attack surface where malicious actors can exploit the system's trust model to execute arbitrary code.
The technical root cause lies in the Workflow._execute_include() method which implements an unsafe import mechanism using raw importlib.util.spec_from_file_location() and spec.loader.exec_module() calls. This implementation bypasses existing security controls that should normally protect against unauthorized code execution by not honoring critical configuration flags such as PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS or PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS. These opt-in gates represent essential security boundaries designed to prevent automatic loading of potentially malicious code from local directories, but they are completely ignored in this specific code path.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it allows for arbitrary Python code execution at the earliest stage of workflow processing, occurring before any child workflow parsing or model calls. This timing is particularly dangerous because it enables attackers to inject malicious code that executes during the initial setup phase of the workflow system itself. The vulnerability affects not only direct calls to Workflow._execute_include() but also reaches through the higher-level praisonai.recipe.run() API, expanding the potential attack vectors significantly. The exploit requires an attacker to convince a victim process to execute a workflow containing an untrusted local recipe, but once achieved, provides complete code execution privileges as the PraisonAI process user.
This vulnerability represents a sophisticated bypass of previously implemented security hardening measures that were designed to protect against automatic tools.py RCE advisories. The attack pattern demonstrates a clear understanding of the system's architecture and exploits a specific code path that was not adequately protected by existing safeguards. The implementation follows a pattern consistent with CWE-470 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption and CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code, where external inputs are directly executed without proper sanitization or validation. From an ATT&CK perspective, this vulnerability maps to T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter and T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, as it enables remote code execution through legitimate system interfaces.
The fix implemented in versions 4.6.58 of praisonai and 1.6.58 of praisonaiagents addresses this by ensuring that all recipe include operations properly validate against the existing opt-in gates before executing any code from external sources. This remediation restores the intended security boundaries and prevents the bypass of centralized safe loaders that protect other tools.py autoload paths within the system. The solution maintains backward compatibility while strengthening security controls around workflow includes, preventing unauthorized code execution through local recipe directories.