CVE-2026-55537 in PraisonAI
Summary
by MITRE • 08/25/2026
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url() accepts webhook_url when resolution raises socket.gaierror because the exception path uses except socket.gaierror: pass. JobExecutor._send_webhook() later performs a fresh lookup, allowing DNS changes to direct the request to an internal service. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/25/2026
The vulnerability identified in PraisonAI versions prior to 4.6.58 represents a significant security flaw rooted in improper exception handling during input validation, specifically within the JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url() method. This function is responsible for verifying that provided webhook URLs are well-formed and safe before they are processed by the system's job execution engine. The core technical failure lies in the use of an empty except block to catch socket.gaierror exceptions. In Python, a socket.gaierror typically indicates a DNS resolution failure or invalid hostname format. By catching this exception and executing pass, the validation logic effectively ignores any errors that occur during the initial domain name lookup. Consequently, if the DNS query fails due to a malformed URL or other network issues, the function does not raise an error but instead proceeds as if the URL were valid, allowing potentially malicious or misconfigured webhook addresses to enter the system's processing pipeline.
This validation bypass creates a critical opportunity for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks through DNS rebinding techniques. Although the initial validation is flawed, the JobExecutor._send_webhook() method performs its own fresh DNS lookup at the time of execution. This discrepancy between the static validation phase and the dynamic execution phase allows an attacker to exploit changes in DNS resolution. An attacker can register a domain that initially resolves to a public or benign IP address during the initial check, satisfying any superficial checks if they were present, but then rapidly update their DNS records via Dynamic DNS services to point to internal network addresses such as 127.0.0.1, 192.168.x.x, or other private ranges before the webhook request is actually sent. Because PraisonAI does not enforce strict allow-listing of domains or IP addresses at the execution stage, it will blindly follow these DNS redirects and send sensitive data to internal services that are typically inaccessible from external networks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe for organizations deploying PraisonAI in cloud environments or on-premises infrastructure where internal services are exposed via private IPs. An attacker who can control webhook URLs passed to the system could exfiltrate sensitive information, such as API keys, user data, or internal configuration details, by directing the outgoing requests to an external server they control. Alternatively, if the internal network contains vulnerable services that respond to specific HTTP methods with detailed error messages or administrative interfaces, the attacker could use this vector to probe and exploit those internal assets. This effectively turns PraisonAI into a pivot point for lateral movement within the target network, bypassing perimeter security controls that rely on IP reputation rather than strict domain validation.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, as the system fails to adequately sanitize or validate user-supplied input before processing it. Furthermore, it is closely related to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), specifically leveraging DNS rebinding techniques to bypass initial security checks. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK framework tactics, this flaw facilitates the Initial Access and Discovery phases, allowing adversaries to leverage trusted internal applications to reach otherwise restricted resources. The specific technique employed falls under T1557: Adversary-in-the-Middle or more accurately T1090: Proxy, as the application is used to relay requests to internal destinations that would not be directly reachable by the attacker.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must upgrade PraisonAI to version 4.6.58 or later, where the validation logic has been corrected to properly handle DNS errors and reject invalid webhook URLs. For systems already deployed in production environments before an update is possible, immediate remediation involves implementing strict allow-listing of permitted domains for webhooks at the network level using firewalls or reverse proxies that inspect outbound traffic. Additionally, developers should ensure that all external-facing services perform validation not just on input format but also enforce IP address restrictions during execution to prevent DNS rebinding attacks. It is crucial to avoid empty exception handlers in security-critical code paths and instead log errors explicitly while raising appropriate exceptions to halt processing of untrusted data.