CVE-2026-55658 in Gardens
Summary
by MITRE • 09/03/2026
Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. In 3e595f3 and prior, when a streaming proposal is funded, the cluster of streaming contracts moves real pool funds into the proposal's StreamingEscrow to back the Superfluid constant flow agreement (the CFA deposit, plus a 0.5 percent margin). cancelProposal then zeroes the escrow's GDA member units but never reclaims that parked balance, and the permissionless claim() forwards the escrow's entire balance, including the pool funded buffer, to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is chosen by the proposal submitter and defaults to the submitter. The only path that returns escrow funds to the pool is drainToStrategy, which is onlyStrategy and is reached solely from the dispute reject ruling, never from cancel or natural completion. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/03/2026
The vulnerability identified in Gardens v2 represents a critical financial loss vector within its modular governance framework, specifically affecting the lifecycle management of streaming proposals funded by community pools. The system is designed to allow communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. A core feature involves funding streaming proposals where real pool funds are moved into a proposal-specific StreamingEscrow contract to back Superfluid constant flow agreements. This process includes depositing the Constant Flow Agreement (CFA) requirements along with an additional 0.5 percent margin buffer intended to ensure sufficient liquidity for ongoing flows. The flaw emerges during the cancellation phase of this lifecycle, where the system fails to properly reclaim these locked funds, leading to a permanent loss of assets from the governance pool.
The technical root cause lies in the implementation of the cancelProposal function within versions prior to commit 3e595f3. When a proposal is cancelled, the code correctly zeroes out the escrow's GDA member units, effectively removing the beneficiary's claim rights on the streaming flow itself. However, it fails to address the static balance parked in the StreamingEscrow contract that was originally transferred from the pool during funding. This parked balance consists of the CFA deposit and the 0.5 percent margin buffer required for operational stability. Because this balance is not reclaimed or returned to the originating governance pool upon cancellation, these funds remain trapped within the escrow structure associated with a defunct proposal.
The exploitation path leverages the permissionless nature of the claim() function in the StreamingEscrow contract. Although the streaming flow rights are nullified by cancelProposal, the underlying balance remains accessible via claim(). This function forwards the entire remaining balance of the escrow to the designated beneficiary. Since the beneficiary is chosen by the proposal submitter and defaults to the submitter if not explicitly changed, an attacker or malicious actor can initiate a funding request for a streaming proposal using pool funds, cancel it immediately after the flow begins but before any significant time has passed, and then invoke claim(). This action transfers the entire parked balance, including the critical CFA deposit and margin buffer, directly to the submitter. The governance pool is left with neither the original assets nor the ability to recover them through standard operational flows.
The impact of this vulnerability is severe, resulting in direct financial theft from community governance pools without requiring complex exploits or privilege escalation beyond what a legitimate proposal submitter would possess. This undermines the trust model of decentralized autonomous organizations and modular governance systems that rely on secure fund management. The only existing mechanism to return escrow funds to the pool is drainToStrategy; however, this function is restricted by permission checks such as IsOnlyStrategy. It can only be triggered through a dispute reject ruling within the arbitration or voting process. Since cancelProposal does not trigger a dispute rejection state and natural completion paths do not route through drainToStrategy for cancelled proposals, there is no standard operational path to recover these funds once they are parked in the escrow of a cancelled proposal.
This vulnerability maps directly to CWE-215: Information Exposure Through Discrepancy, as it involves a discrepancy between the logical state of the contract (cancelled) and its financial state (funds still accessible). It also aligns with CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow, because the system allows an action that violates the intended lifecycle constraints where cancelled proposals should not retain access to funded assets. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK for decentralized finance, this behavior is consistent with T0923: Exploit Trusted Relationships or more broadly within financial exploitation techniques involving improper asset handling in smart contracts. The lack of a patch at the time of publication highlights the importance of rigorous formal verification and lifecycle state management checks in DeFi governance protocols to prevent such irreversible fund losses.