CVE-2026-57122 in PraisonAI
Summary
by MITRE • 09/14/2026
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.59, the WhatsApp and Linear bot webhook handlers verify HMAC signatures only when WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET or LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is configured and otherwise parse and dispatch unsigned request bodies. A remote unauthenticated client that reaches the webhook route can forge messages, comments, or agent-session events, impersonate platform users, influence agent prompts and actions, and disrupt bot processing. This issue is fixed in 4.6.59.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/14/2026
The vulnerability identified in PraisonAI versions prior to 4.6.59 represents a critical failure in authentication verification for webhook endpoints associated with WhatsApp and Linear integrations. As a multi-agent teams system, PraisonAI relies on secure communication channels between external services and its internal agent orchestration logic. The core technical flaw lies in the conditional implementation of HMAC signature verification within the webhook handlers. Specifically, the system only validates the cryptographic signatures of incoming requests if the environment variables WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET or LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET are explicitly configured by the administrator. In scenarios where these secrets are not set, which is common during initial setup, testing, or misconfiguration, the application bypasses signature verification entirely and proceeds to parse and dispatch unsigned request bodies directly into the agent processing pipeline. This design decision creates a significant attack surface for remote unauthenticated actors who can interact with the exposed webhook routes without needing valid credentials or signed payloads.
From an operational perspective, this lack of integrity checking allows attackers to forge messages, comments, or internal agent-session events as if they originated from legitimate users or connected services. By injecting maliciously crafted requests into the system, a remote attacker can impersonate platform users and manipulate the context in which AI agents operate. This capability enables the influence of agent prompts and actions, potentially leading to unauthorized data access, execution of unintended commands, or manipulation of multi-agent workflows. The ability to disrupt bot processing further compounds the risk by allowing denial-of-service conditions or causing erratic behavior within the automated team structures that rely on accurate input streams. Such vulnerabilities undermine the trustworthiness of AI-driven automation and can lead to severe security breaches depending on the permissions granted to the affected agents.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-347, Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature, as the application fails to consistently verify cryptographic signatures for integrity validation before processing input data. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1608, Spearphishing Attachment, in contexts where webhook payloads are used to deliver malicious instructions or social engineering content directly into agent memory spaces, although more broadly it reflects general injection and authentication bypass patterns common in API integrations. The absence of mandatory signature verification violates the principle of least privilege and secure defaults, as systems should never accept unsigned critical control data by default regardless of configuration state unless explicitly designed for open public APIs with alternative security controls.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must ensure that PraisonAI is updated to version 4.6.59 or later, where the logic has been corrected to enforce signature verification consistently. For environments still running older versions, immediate remediation involves configuring the required secret environment variables for all active webhook integrations before exposing them to external networks. Administrators should also implement network-level access controls such as IP whitelisting on the webhook endpoints to restrict access only to known legitimate sources from WhatsApp and Linear services. Additionally, implementing rate limiting and input validation at the reverse proxy or API gateway level can provide an additional layer of defense against forged requests. Regular security audits of integration configurations are recommended to ensure that no service endpoint operates without proper authentication mechanisms enabled by default.